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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes the widespread transgressions of U.S. constitutional, international 
and military law post-9/11. My aim is to illustrate how the tripartite problematizations of 
terrorism, national security and increased presidential authority constituted the dual 
emergence of the medieval sovereign and unlawful combatants as governmental 
subjects/objects. This thesis uses archaeological and genealogical discourse analysis in 
illustrating how post-9/11 texts transformed modalities of thought and deployments of 
executive power against newly constituted threats. I use Giorgio Agamben and Michel 
Foucault as intellectual reference points in explicating the formation of new 
political/legal discourses and practices that violate existing legal standards. I argue that 
although both theorists offer insightful theoretical contributions, they fall short in 
accounting for the emergence of the “security-sovereign” that is unrestrained by 
rationalities and logics of security and sovereignty. The result is a new avatar of 
sovereignty that developed and authorized indefinite detention and torture against the 
suspected “evil doer”.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this research project is to analyze the War on Terror and the dual 
emergence of sovereign power and unlawful combatants as post-9/11 discursive 
subjects/objects. I draw on Foucauldian genealogical and archaeological critical discourse 
analysis and its accompanying way of considering power, knowledge and truth. The 9/11 
attacks are widely considered as the most devastating attacks on the United States since 
the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor during WWII. The terrorist attacks were met with 
extraordinary measures by the world's superpower, the United States. President Bush 
promptly declared a global "War on Terror" against the state of Afghanistan (the Taliban 
being in de facto control of the region) and decentralized terrorist networks operating 
within and across state boundaries (Cutler, 2005; Henn, 2010).  
The 9/11 attacks were met with unfettered (also referred to as sovereign power) 
U.S. presidential authority. On September 25th 2001, declared the official executive 
position of the Bush Administration in the Yoo-Flanigan Memo:  
Military action need not be limited to those individuals, groups, or states that                         
participated in the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon; the                       
Constitution vests the President with the power to strike terrorist groups or                          
organizations that cannot be demonstrably linked to the September 11                                   
incidents (Yoo, 2001, p. 19).  
The Yoo-Flanigan Memo paved the way for a juridical-political discourse that facilitated 
the expansion of presidential authority. Following the memo, President Bush issued the 
November 13th, 2001 Military Order that authorized "the indefinite detention and trial by 
military commissions of noncitizens suspected of involvement in terrorist activity" 
(Agamben, 2005, p. 3; See also Bush, 2001a, p.1). The Yoo-Flanigan Memo and 
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President Bush’s Military Order not only established the Administration’s official 
position in dealing with the War on Terror but it also formed the post-9/11 discursive 
formation that came to dominate both the juridical and scholastic/academic modalities of 
thought (Evans; 2002; Henn, 2010). This thesis argues that these key texts established 
specific modalities of thought concerning the dual emergence of increased presidential 
authority and an enemy outside of existing legal protections.  
This study asks the question of whether the classification and treatment of 
unlawful combatants is representative of the ancient and absolute power over death 
embodied by the Roman sovereign as one finds in Agamben's depiction of the political 
sphere, or is illustrative of the emergence of a new sovereign power that problematizes 
existential threats and enemies that requires extraordinary measures as solutions. This 
thesis uncovers the power/knowledge (discourse) dynamic posed by post-9/11 
problematizations. Thus, the central research questions are: 1) did the Yoo-Flanigan 
Memo, the Military Order and the Executive Order problematize legal/political 
discourses, modalities of thought and deployments of power that constituted unlawful 
combatants as dehumanized governmental subjects/objects? 2) What role does sovereign 
power over life and death play in the problematization, rationalization and justification of 
post-9/11 state violence?  
In aiming to speak to these research questions, I draw on Foucault's tripartite 
analysis of "sovereignty, discipline and government" as modalities of power-knowledge, 
their corresponding technologies of power, and means of rationalization. In doing so, this 
thesis argues that specific problematizations articulated by high ranking executive 
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officials (reliant on expert discourse) shaped and facilitated shifting rationalities and 
logics of how to govern in post-9/11 governance illustrative of paranoia, risk and 
uncertainty (Valverde, 2010, p. 12). This facilitates the critical analysis of unlawful 
combatants and subsequent solutions formulated in expert discourse. I argue that the rise 
of post-9/11 sovereign power is at the core of the problematization of unlawful 
combatants. The triparatite post-9/11 problematizations of national security, existential 
threat and terrorism justified extreme discursive deployments of state power.  In the 
present study, I argue that pertinent post-9/11 documents manufactured unlawful 
combatants and plenary presidential authority as political subjects/objects. 
This research also outlines the strengths and weaknesses of Agamben’s analysis 
of Foucault’s multi-layered analytics of the political sphere and the War on Terror. 
Agamben’s works, Homo Sacer (1998) and the State of Exception (2005), use pertinent 
Foucauldian conceptual analysis of sovereignty and biopolitics in theorizing the rise of 
plenary presidential power, the designation of “enemy combatants” and the violations of 
constitutional, international and human rights law. Agamben’s theoretical analysis has 
been extraordinarily influential in academic circles in providing a conceptual tool in 
explicating post-9/11 American foreign policy (See Mountz, 2013). Despite this, it is 
crucial to critically inspect it not least since there are significant limitations in them. His 
claim that the War on Terror and unlawful combatant policy is largely illustrative of 
roman sovereign power is problematic. Foucault’s theoretical and genealogical 
approaches are explicit: modern governmentality encompasses power-knowledge and 
with it, technologies of power that operate to dominate every aspect of human life 
(Foucault, 2007, p. 108; Hunt & Wickham, 1994, pp. 13-14). Agamben’s theoretical 
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conflation of biopower and sovereignty wholly disregards Foucauldian scholarship 
regarding both concepts (Datta 2010); the biopolitical monstrosity is only resurrected to 
differentiate between what are deemed to be desirable and undesirable human subspecies 
(Dean, 2010, pp. 163-164; Foucault, 1978. pp. 137-138) whereas the power to take life or 
let live is exercised over those who transgress the monarch’s law (See Foucault, 1977b, p. 
130). Put differently, there are good reasons for being critical about Agamben’s 
appropriations of Foucault’s concepts. In summary, this thesis addresses the need for a 
more careful analysis of the problematizations and practices surrounding the dual 
problematizations of unlawful combatants and plenary presidential power as 
subjects/objects and the extent to which Agambenian and Foucauldian analyses of law, 
sovereignty and power can be used in explicating post-9/11 governance.  
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2. CRIMINOLOGICAL RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE 
The main focuses of this thesis are longstanding issues in political criminology, the 
sociology of law, political sociology, constitutional and international law, and human 
rights. This thesis explores matters that are unfortunately all too often marginal in 
criminological literature and discussions of criminal justice systems (See Rothe & 
Freidrichs, 2006; Rothe & Ross, 2008). Criminology and domestic criminal justice 
systems, on the whole, direct inadequate attention to questioning and explaining the 
longstanding license of high ranking government officials that violate criminal, 
constitutional, and international human and legal rights (Iadicola, 2011. p. 123; Kramer & 
Michaelowski, 2011, p. 112; Rothe, 2011, pp. 199-200). The concept of “state crime” is 
helpful in this respect. State crimes are “Acts defined by law as criminal and committed 
by state officials in pursuit of their jobs as representatives of the state” (Chambliss, 1989, 
p. 184). They can be committed “for ideological purposes” and offenders believe they are 
following a “higher conscious”- i.e. usually dehumanizing the enemy - (Hagan, 1997, p. 
2). State crimes negatively impact the cultural, economic, political and legal 
environments at the state and international levels (Hoofnagle, 2011; Rothe & Mullins, 
2006). While state crime can be measured at the micro (i.e. the individual), meso-levels 
(organization) and macro level (state), this thesis largely concerns the state-structural 
analysis of criminality/wrongdoing whereby executive officials systematically 
institutionalize  policies that have the potential to   dehumanize, incarcerate and eliminate 
entire races of people (See Iadicola, 2011; See also Kramer & Michaelowski, 2011). High 
ranking foreign policy officials post-9/11 are exempt from prosecution and moral 
condemnation precisely because they constitute and institutionalize discourses and 
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policies that brand their enemies as evil doers, criminals and/or terrorists while 
constituting themselves as democratic liberators (See Bush 2001a; 2001b; 2002a). This 
can be exacerbated by the circumstance that law and criminal justice is articulated, 
formulated and adjudicated by high level governmental authorities. Criminology 
fundamentally fails as a discipline if it fails to attend to the illegalities, crimes, wrong-
doings and harms committed by state officials and instead narrowly concentrates on 
individual offenders (see Bassiouni, 2011, pp. 27-28; See also Chambliss, 1989, p. 184). I 
believe that the suspension of existing legal standards and the widespread regimes of 
torture are worthy of criminological consideration. 
Public discourse, government officials and academics have no issue in declaring 
the systematic extermination of Jews by Nazi Germany as being criminal and immoral 
(Friedrichs, 2011, pp. 55-60). Considerable evidence from lasting documents 
demonstrates the German support for Nazi human experimentation and extermination 
policies to “effectively address economic and political turmoil [and] to restore law and 
order” (Friedrichs, 2011, p. 66). German jurisprudence privileged Nazi executive decrees 
over formal legislative law by declaring that state preservation and necessity undermined 
constitutional law (Friedrichs, 2011, p. 65; Ott & Buob, 1993). The Nazi party enacted  
“Article 48” of the Weimar Constitution in 1933 and declared a “state of emergency” that 
lasted until 1945 (Agamben, 2005, p. 6; See also Schmitt, 1985). The enactment of 
“Article 48” gave the Nazi executive government the authority in suspending all 
constitutional safeguards and protections (Kennedy, 2011; Schmitt, 1985). In doing so, 
the executive suspended the existing legal regime, initiated aggressive foreign 
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occupations and engaged in a systematic biopolitical eugenics program to rid Europe and 
the world of “parasitic Jews” (See Foucault, 1978).  
Academic literature and “western” governments condemn Nazi Germany’s Final 
Solution and aggressive foreign occupations (Friedrichs, 2011, p. 58). Despite this, post-
9/11 American foreign policy raises similar legal and moral concerns over the reach of 
“state power,” its scope, and what laws and democratic checks may constrain it. The U.S. 
government post-9/11, much like the Nazis, dehumanize the enemy to “produce reactions 
of apathy, indifference, and passivity” while engaging in aggressive foreign invasions in 
violation of constitutional and international law (Bassiouni, 2011, p. 6), institutionalized, 
battle lab torture experiments (See Denbeaux, Hafetz, Denbeaux et al, 2015) and rectal 
force-feeding practices against purchased human test subjects (See Hutchinson et al, 
2013; See also Feinstein, 2014). Moreover, high ranking government officials’ post-9/11 
constructed executive memos and authorizations that systematically institutionalized 
discourses of preemptive war, retaliation and torture against individuals, groups and 
states irrespective of past “wrongdoing” (Yoo, 2001, p. 1; 2005). To demonstrate, just 
fourteen days after 9/11, the executive issued the Yoo-Flanigan Memo that gave the 
President the “constitutional authority not only to retaliate against any person, 
organization, or state suspected of involvement in terrorist attacks on the United States, 
but also against foreign States suspected of harbouring or supporting such organizations” 
(Yoo, 2001, p. 1).  
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3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This thesis applies Foucault’s concepts of knowledge, power, law and governmentality to 
analyze expert post-9/11 discourse. I deploy Foucault’s concepts - similarly to how you 
would use a “box of tools” - (Foucault, 1977a, p. 208) to analyze power relations and the 
problematizations that rationalize and justify a singularity of statements dealing in 
“unlawful combatants” (Foucault, 1977a, p. 207; 2002, p. 220). Here problematization 
means discursive resources, governmental institutions and actors that pose the problem of 
how to govern while also delimiting frameworks for identifying what counts as an urgent 
“problem” requiring expert “solutions” (Datta, 2008, p. 182; See also Dean, 2010, pp. 37-
38). The problematization of specific objects by high ranking officials actively shapes or 
directs conduct through regimes of practices (ways of directing the self and others 
through multiple rationalities and technologies which constitute objects of government), 
(Dean, 2010, pp. 268-269) truth, forms of knowledge, and “predilection of how to 
govern” (Gordon, 1991, p. 7). Prisoners captured during the War on Terror are 
problematized by expert discourse as evil savages that must be detained indefinitely to 
avoid future terrorist attacks (Bush, 2001a).  
 The Foucault conceptual toolbox provides the researcher the ability to uncover 
ruptures, discontinuities, transformations and displacements in the problematization of 
human existence (Mahon, 1983, p. 105). For the purposes of this thesis, Foucauldian 
theory is not employed as a singular tool to answer and uncover everything.  Rather, it is 
used as a tool to analyze specificities of discursive practices, problematizations, 
techniques and apparatuses of power in accordance with new political/legal discourses 
(Foucault, 2002, p. 135; Veyne, 1997, pp. 8-9). In doing so, this thesis does not seek to 
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uncover some underlying truth but instead discerns the conditions of possibility, 
conditions of emergence, the technologies of power, power-knowledge, and discursive 
materials that provide the researcher a privileged unexamined window (similar to the 
panopticon tower) into the dual emergence of unfettered presidential power and unlawful 
combatants (Foucault, 1977b, p. 196; Neal, 2006, p. 35). This “privileged window” into 
post-9/11 discourse uses the toolbox in uncovering and then revealing power where it is 
both delimiting and constraining and while at the same time, productive and deemed true 
(Foucault, 2002, p. 80; Neal, 2006, pp. 34-35). Post-9/11 discourse produced knowledge 
of unlawful combatants that led policy “solutions” indicative of preemptive military 
occupation and indefinite detention of a constituted evil and dangerous political 
subject/object (Foucault, 1994a, p. 185). Foucault’s theoretical toolbox does not aim to 
develop a model of the “totality” of power in society; rather, it provides an instrument to 
unravel the specific actualizations of power-knowledge dynamics (Dean, 1994, pp. 158-
162). In other words, the Foucauldian conceptual toolbox does not seek to develop a 
general theory of power but operates to uncover specific, localized sites and operations of 
knowledge, power and discourse.  
Power, knowledge and the subject are at the core of the Foucault’s theoretical 
toolbox. Post-9/11 discourse is the result of an elaborate set-up, derived, in part by key 
mechanisms apprehensible by use of Foucauldian concepts (Datta, 2008, p. 83). Power, 
(the first key Foucauldian concept examined in this thesis) cannot be conceptualized as 
good, bad, possessed or strictly prohibitory (Clifford, 2001; Veyne, 2010). Contrarily, 
power has a productive, “micro-physics” element that trains disparate, “useless,” and 
potentially dangerous bodies into productive forces (Foucault, 1977b, p. 170; 1994b, p. 
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84). For Foucault, power cannot be described in a general theory but needs to be 
understood in connection with specific manifestations of the multiplicity of relations of 
domination, techniques for targeting the constitution of bodies and their capacities and 
apparatuses of a case under investigation (Foucault, 1977b, p. 219; Foucault, 1994c, pp. 
xv-xvi). Relations, techniques and apparatus's of power are in part, shaped by rationalities 
of rule for organizing and coordinating human multiplicities (See Datta, 2007) such as 
sovereignty, discipline and governmentality. 
The “early” genealogical Foucault was primarily concerned with the “micro-
physics” and small powers whereas the “middle-later” Foucault in his Lecture Series was 
more concerned with governmentality and the juridico-discursive representation (Jessop, 
2007, p. 36). This form of power is productive but is also prohibitory and is concentrated 
on “nothing more than the statement of the law and operation of taboos” (Foucault, 1978, 
p. 85). What is important for this study is not the operation of this kind of power being 
restricted to one model (sovereignty or discipline) but instead to a variety of strategic 
analyzes, tactical deployments of political technologies, and force relations (See Dupont 
& Peace, 2001).  I do not analyze post-9/11 governance according to “zero sum models of 
governance” (Valverde, 2010, p. 11) but rather by “diverse authorities… programmes, 
techniques, apparatuses, documents, and procedures” (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 175). 
Diverse and heterogeneous logics and rationalities of governance (e.g. liberal 
constitutionalism and sovereign power) function at different levels to ensure governance 
and security (Valverde, 2010, p. 12).  
The second concept to be explicated in light of the research is “knowledge.” The 
Foucauldian approach opposes the enlightenment view that knowledge can only flourish 
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in the absence of coercive functions of power (Hunt & Wickham, 1994, p. 13). The 
formation of any body of knowledge involves the "power dimensions within which the 
knowledge is produced" (Hunt & Wickham, 1994, p. 13). This position is explicated in 
Discipline and Punish: 
We should admit... that power produces knowledge (and not simply                           
encouraging because  it serves power or by applying it because it is                                    
useful ); that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that                              
there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field                                    
of knowledge, nor any knowledge that not presuppose and constitute at                             
the same time power  relations... the subject who knows, the objects to be                         
known and the modalities of knowledge must be regarded as so many                        
effects of these fundamental implications power/knowledge and their                          
historical transformations (Foucault, 1977b, pp. 27-28).  
“Enunciative modalities” (which include the right to speak, the institutional sites, style of 
elaboration and position of subject) within the sites of production privilege and valorize 
some forms of knowledge while marginalizing and excluding others (Foucault, 1977a; 
2002, pp. 50-55). For example, Yoo-Flanigan established and then monopolized specific 
regimes of thinking and practices concerning unlawful combatants.  
The third pertinent Foucauldian concept pertains to modalities of subjectivity, 
“subjectivation” in particular. For the purposes of this thesis, I focus my analysis on 
Foucault’s concept of subjectivation as found in Foucault’s work on discipline and 
governmentality. To be clear, subjectivation refers to the “the infra-constituting subject 
and… [how] subjects become self-reflexive” and “use techniques to cultivate or make, a 
self” (Datta, 2008, p. 169). The subject “does not pre-exist”, but is constituted, in part, 
through the constitution of “objects of knowledge”, practices, reflections and techniques 
(Datta, 2008, p. 169). This research analyzes the political subject/object (the post-9/11 
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sovereign) alongside external rationalities of power relations through “the antagonism of 
strategies” (Foucault, 1994d, p. 329). The post-9/11 sovereign (via pertinent texts) 
problematized terrorism and unlawful combatants as governmental domains and 
rationalities. I argue that plenary presidential and executive authority, including the 
unilateral decision to establish military commissions and an enemy without rights (Bush, 
2001a; Henn, 2010, pp. 67-79) was partly the result of the problematizations of national 
security and existential threats posed by terrorism. This thesis analyzes how discursive 
War on Terror strategies link knowledge, position of authority and qualification. Pertinent 
post-9/11 texts, via authorities of delimitation in the Bush Administration (experts in 
unique positions that determine true and false), constrained, delimited and marginalized 
the political subject by producing knowledge that was then attached to individual 
subjectivity/identity (Foucault, 1994d, p. 331). The Bush Administration manufactured 
knowledge of authoritative statements (a detainee is an enemy and an “evil doer”) which 
was then deemed in discourse and modalities of thought as being true and right – the evil 
and dangerous evil doer - (See Foucault, 1994d, p. 330).  
I. Governmentality: Security, Discipline and Biopower: 
My point here is not to suggest that apparatuses of sovereignty in the classical era 
operated without apparatuses of discipline and government. Moreover, this project does 
not claim that apparatuses of government completely displace discipline and sovereignty 
in the modern age. Literature on sovereign rule overstates “sovereign hegemony over 
subjects and territory” (Deukmedjian, 2013, p. 56). As Foucault suggests, techniques of 
disciplinary power were employed throughout Europe during the plague regulations of 
the 16th century (Foucault, 2007, p. 10).  Partitioning grids specified where people could 
 13 
 
go, the type of food they could eat and prohibited and produced certain types of 
acceptable conduct (Foucault, 2007, p. 10). During this period, the science of the police 
emerged from the problematization of “a multitude of sites” that sought to regulate 
hygiene, health and deviant behaviour of populations (Foucault, 1994e, p. 92). The 
science of the police, including the Paris police, operated alongside apparatuses of 
security and discipline in the 18th century, by way of a centrifugal and centripetal duality 
of sovereignty (Deukmedjian, 2013). Police emerged equipped to deal with the smallest 
complaints including injuries, accidents, robberies and the breach of peace (Deukmedjian, 
2013; Mildmay, 1763). Furthermore, ministry officials were tasked with spying on the 
population in local coffee shops to listen for possible high treason and sedition 
(Deukmedjian, 2013, p. 56; Mildmay, 1763, pp. 50-51).  
 Apparatuses of discipline and security function in unison with traditional criminal 
justice and police concerns. Discipline corrects and enforces breaches of codes and 
undesirable conduct by targeting and individualizing the body and its capacities 
(Deukmedian, 2013, p. 54; Foucault, 1977b, p. 140). Foucault demonstrated this 
conceptualization in Security, Territory, Population: 
we should not see things as the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a 
society of discipline, and then of a society by a society, say of government. In fact 
we have a triangle: sovereignty, discipline and government management which 
has its main target and apparatuses of security as its essential mechanism (2007, 
pp. 107-108).  
 Disciplinary policing functions to minimize individual breaches of the law, restore harm 
and prevent crime (Lentoz & Rose, 2009) in accordance with a retroactive, after-the-fact 
prosecution. On the other hand, apparatuses of security do not operate to correct minor 
behaviour or breaches of codes but instead “let[s] things happen” (Deukmedjian, 2013, p. 
55) according to constituted threats as deemed important by security agents (Datta, 2011, 
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pp. 218-219). Security thus functions by measuring the frequency and severity of risks 
and deploys practices and mechanisms of preemption, containment and elimination when 
the constituted threshold transgresses an imagined, improved and safe securitized future 
(Datta, 2011; Deukmedjian, 2013, p. 55). In this way, apparatuses of security operate in 
the continuous shifting of governmental rationalities according to purported future threats 
(Deukmedjian, 2013; Lentoz & Rose, 2009).  
Apparatuses of security, “a resolutely heterogeneous grouping composing 
discourses, institutions… policy decisions, laws… moral and philanthropic propositions”, 
(Rainbow & Rose, 2003, pp. 10-11) functions to disrupt, contain and eliminate 
(Deukmedjian, 2013, p. 58) potential risks while discipline (anatomo-politics) is deployed 
to maintain the territory of the sovereign. Similarly, in modern governance, the 
sovereign’s head has yet to be removed from governmental and political discourse 
(Foucault, 1994f, p. 122). Rationalities of governmentality operate to secure populations 
against purported future risks/threats alongside logics and mechanisms of security, 
discipline and sovereignty.  
  My concern here is to demonstrate the re-emergence of sovereign power post-
9/11 and its unlimited power over the vengeance of the regicide’s body. My aim is to 
illustrate the emergence of a new avatar of sovereignty, entrenched in logics and tactics 
of security. While the monarchical sovereign deployed his vengeance over the 
transgressor, the post-9/11 sovereign operates to displace, contain and eliminate 
imagined, future existential threats. The formation of unlawful combatants as 
governmental subject/objects differs from traditional prisoners of war.  By way of 
example, newly constituted “evil doers” are undeserving of traditional legal protections 
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and are instead subject to indefinite political possibilities against the mind and body, 
including but not limited to indefinite detention without charge, torture and arbitrary 
assassination (See Darmer, 2009; See also Dratel, 2005). This thesis aims to explicate 
how post-9/11 foreign policy, based on imagined risk, fear and uncertainty constituted the 
emergence of new modalities of thoughts and discursive deployments in fighting the War 
on Terror.  
The Foucauldian conceptual toolbox provides the researcher with the necessary 
means to uncover discontinuities and ruptures in the problematizations of specific 
objects. In the case of the present study, I analyze the techniques, mechanisms and tactics 
deployed by expert post-9/11 discursive governance. High ranking executive officials 
(via pertinent texts) constructs and designates between true and erroneous games of truth. 
Unlawful combatants are deemed dangerous subjects/objects that require preemptive, 
indefinite detention to avoid future terrorist attacks. In this respect, the unlawful 
combatant designation constitutes the political subject/object outside of existing legal 
standards.  This requires focusing on the construction of unlawful combatant discourse 
alongside the technologies and apparatuses of power that justify deployments of state 
power, including the power to differentiate between “what must live and what must die” 
(Foucault, 2003, p. 254).  This thesis does not ask how the unlawful combatant is morally 
justified but instead analyzes “the constitution of knowledges and domains of objects” 
(Foucault, 1994f, p. 118) that uncovers ruptures and discontinuities.  
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4. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Post-9/11 juridico-political discourse has been the object of extraordinary attention in 
academic circles including governmentality studies (See Dean, 2007). Drawing from key 
Foucauldian concepts, Giorgio Agamben explicates his conceptual analysis of 
sovereignty in the State of Exception (2005). For Agamben, unfettered presidential 
authority in President Bush’s Military Order resurrected and reasserted the unlimited 
power of the sovereign. Since his initial formulation, Agamben's conception of 
“exception” has been used by various academics to explain the perceived lacunae in legal 
discourse and deployments of state power pertaining to the War on Terror.  
Agamben furthered his arguments about “exception” by way of three historical 
examples. He demonstrated how (in each case), an American President was forced to 
suspend constitutional law due to internal threats posed by the Civil War and the Great 
Depression and external threats faced during World Wars I and II. Despite strict 
constitutional restrictions on presidential power during a state of emergency, Presidents 
Lincoln, Wilson and Roosevelt issued executive orders to save the Union1 (Agamben, 
2005, pp. 20-22). In each case, the President ("acting" through sovereign power) 
suspended existing congressional power (Agamben, 2005, pp. 20-22). However, in each 
case, the President restored constitutional order subsequent to the ceasing of purported 
existential threats.  
In conceptualizing the “exception”, Agamben demonstrated the "lawlessness" of 
the enemy, who are neither afforded POW status as per the Geneva Conventions, nor the 
                                                           
1 The U.S. Constitution does not designate increased presidential authority during times of war.  
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status of being charged under American criminal law (Agamben, 2005, pp. 3-4). For 
Agamben, detainees are "the object of pure de facto rule" (2005, p. 3). Agamben furthers 
this argument by claiming that President Bush's “decision to refer to himself as the 
Commander in Chief” is a direct reference to post-9/11 sovereign powers (2005, p. 22). 
According to Agamben, the force of law (i.e. executive orders) is a “fictio iuris par 
excellence which claims to maintain the law in its very suspension” while at the same 
time initiating violence that “sheds every relation to law” (2005, p. 59). The state of 
exception is not a state of law but “a space without law” (Agamben, 2005, pp. 50-51). 
When the power of the executive and legislative are fused into one man and becomes 
legal norm, the juridico/political system becomes a “killing machine” (Agamben, 2005, p. 
86). In short, Agamben contends that the state of exception is a space without law and the 
political subjects are at the mercy of an all-powerful Leviathan.  
I. Agamben and Biopolitics: 
The designation of bare life produced by the biopolitical sovereign decision is the central 
argument found throughout Agamben’s conceptual works of Homo Sacer (1998) and The 
State of Exception (2005). According to Agamben, the production of a biopolitical body 
designates between those included and excluded from the polity. This biopolitical 
relationship constitutes “the original activity of sovereign power” and dates back to 
Ancient Roman practices whereby those excluded from the city were reduced to the 
status of homo sacer (or sacred man) (Agamben, 1998, pp. 6-7). The homo sacer is 
removed from the protections of public life and is thus entirely stripped of his/her highest 
good (Datta, 2010, p. 170). However, the homo sacer is not geographically removed from 
public life; s/he remains within the polity and can be killed by a citizen without fear of 
 18 
 
punishment (Agamben, 1998, p. 139). In this way, s/he is both inside and outside the law 
and is placed in a zone of indistinction, between the “human creature “(another word to 
describe bare life) and political existence (Agamben, 1998, p. 9; 2004aC, p. 12; 
Durantaye, 2009, p. 202).  
The sovereign-biopolitical relationship is “the original structure in which law 
encompasses living beings by means of its own suspension” (Agamben, 2005, p. 3). The 
Patriot Act and President Bush’s Military Order authorized the creation of two 
subjects/objects not contained within the existing legal classificatory system. Newly 
constituted presidential powers authorized extraordinary deployments of power, including 
the indefinite detention of unlawful combatants outside of existing constitutional, military 
and international law (Agamben, 2005, p. 3). Agamben compares the treatment of 
unlawful combatants to the legal lacunae experienced by Jewish prisoners in Nazi death 
and concentration camps who lost both their identity and citizenship (Agamben, 1998, p. 
68; 2005)  For him, the classification of detainees (as unlawful combatants) established 
an enemy fundamentally outside of legal-political domains (Agamben, 2005). In this 
respect, the problematization of enemy combatants is akin to that surrounding an 
infection that “would conduct attacks on civilized people not in the form of sovereign 
states but by shadowy networks” (Dean, 2007, p. 171). Post-9/11 expert political/legal 
discourse justified the space of exception to institutionalize torture, export torture to 
undeveloped countries, and use advanced psychological and medical expertise to extract 
vital information (See Dean, 2007; See also Denbeaux et. al, 2015).  
 
II. State Crime: 
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In recuperating the analysis of state crime in criminological research, one must take note 
of a lacuna in its discursive formations and the discipline as a whole. Criminological 
discourse largely concerns itself with individual offenders while neglecting the 
actions/interests of the powerful.  This is problematic for several reasons. First, the 
traditional “street criminal” usually only harms a handful of victims whereas the state 
wages war against entire geopolitical territories, sometimes killing millions in the process 
(Barak, 1991, pp. 4-6; Bassiouni, 2011, p. 15; See also Michaelowski, Chambliss & 
Kramer, 2010). The issue of harm is central to this argument; state law concerning 
individual offenders has increasingly become more punitive in recent years, whereas laws 
regarding powerful interests (both the state and corporate elites) have largely been 
repealed or neglected (Snider, 2006, p. 180). Arguably, this is reflected in post-9/11 
American governance; the executive branch killed hundreds of thousands of people, has 
indefinitely detained up to 70 000 persons without habeas corpus relief, and has 
institutionalized torture (Dean, 2007, p. 168; Hagopian et al, 2013, p. 1).  
Post-9/11 discourse and criminology in particular have generally neglected 
institutionalized practices of torture and extra-judicial killings (See Iadicola, 2011, p. 
123). Indeed, since the attacks on 9/11, U.S. politicians and high ranking officials 
“euphemized painful interrogation practices, neutralized prohibitions on torture, isolated 
troubling incidents from policy decisions and built on racist and nationalistic discourses 
to deny victims of torture” (Rosso, 2014, p. 383). The sexual assault of female and male 
juvenile suspects at Abu Ghraib highlights the most egregious systematic human rights 
abuses and instances of state violence (Hooks & Mosher, 2005, p. 1629).  These and 
other examples are indicative of the pervasive torture-killing reality that has occurred in 
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combating “evil doers” (Rosso, 2014). In this light, American foreign policy must be seen 
as fundamentally criminal and analyzed through a state crime perspective for its 
systematic, intentional practices that produce significant foreseeable harms. The United 
States established alternative legal codes and justice systems in violation of existing 
domestic, military and international human rights law. These policies are responsible for 
the deployment of practices that tortured innocent people and directly and/or indirectly 
killed hundreds of thousands of people while claiming to fight a moral crusade of 
righteousness (See Bush, 2002b).  
As critical criminologists have noted for more than a generation, all crimes are 
political manifestations reflecting  power struggles in society that in turn affect 
legislatures and subsequent legal discourse in determining what counts as harmful and 
illegal (See Chambliss & Seidman, 1971; See also Quinney, 1970). Therefore, codified 
and state sanctioned public wrongs exist only insofar as the designations, classifications, 
and administrations making explicit reference to legal codes. This circumstance parallels 
those of medieval absolutism whereby all crimes were classified as offenses against the 
sovereign (See Foucault, 1977b). To illustrate, prior to 9/11 terrorism was considered an 
American domestic crime and was subject to FBI jurisdiction and due process (Staff 
Statement, 2004, p. 1). However, pertinent post-9/11 executive documents problematized 
terrorism as an act of war against American national security (i.e. against the sovereign) 
and established alternative justice systems to deal with the newly constituted unlawful 
combatant designation (Bush, 2001, pp. 1-2; Bush, 2002a; Henn, 2010). In accordance 
with the Military Order (pp. 1-2), all non-U.S. citizens are deemed potential threats and 
can be indefinitely detained without trial. Therefore, it is more apt to theorize post-9/11 
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state crime as “sovereign state crime” and/or “sovereign injustice”. Military commissions 
(constituted by the Military Order) suspended existing legal discourses, practices, 
congressional and judicial powers while constituting existing criminal acts (terrorism) as 
existential threats to U.S. national security (Bush, 2001a, pp. 1-2). Detainees since have 
been subjects/objects to indefinite detention without habeas corpus relief, been victims of 
corporal punishment (similar to the revenge of the sovereign against the regicide as one 
finds in Discipline and Punish) by executive officials and remain outside of American 
domestic or international legal jurisdiction (Bush, 2001a; Cutler, 2005, pp. 187-190). 
These acts never have been considered criminal and/or harmful by international courts 
(e.g. International Criminal Court) precisely due to the United States position in 
international relations as a “hard power” (See Nye, 2009).  
Criminology fails as a discipline if it does not consider post-9/11 foreign policy as 
criminal and/or harmful. Sovereign states have unique power-knowledge dynamics 
whereby expert discourses are tactically deployed to problematize and transform 
criminal, constitutional, military and international law, and modalities of thought 
concerning terrorism, torture and sovereignty. Sovereign states for instance, advance 
discourses and rationalities of state self-determination2 (witness the Bush 
Administration’s occupation of both Afghanistan and Iraq) prior to and during aggressive 
foreign invasions (Weber, 1995, p. 125, 8). The Bush Administration could not justify its 
actions by appealing to the protection of either Afghanistan or Iraq sovereignty but 
instead appealed to protecting the people’s right to self-determination (Delcourt, 2006, p. 
51). This doctrine is troublesome insofar as the dominant and/or occupying state 
                                                           
2 The argument of state self-determination can be traced back to President Wilson in 1917 (Weber, 1995, 
p. 125) 
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constitutes both the designation of who the people are and their decisions. While the Bush 
Administration claimed to support a government for and by the Iraqi people, the Bush 
Administration established an Iraqi government friendly to American interests, as 
opposed to an Iraqi government for the Iraqi people (Delcourt, 2006, p. 52).  
The Yoo-Flanigan Memo established the institutional bases (in Foucault’s terms, 
the “surfaces of emergence”) that have since justified numerous foreign invasions, the 
dismantling of the Iraqi state and other governments, controversial interrogation methods, 
and extra-judicial assassination (Hudson, Owens & Flannes, 2011; Kretzmer, 2005; 
Passavant, 2010). Conventional criminology has neglected these issues despite egregious 
acts of this kind causing remarkably high levels of harm, including the overthrow of 
existing regimes and the complete destabilization (e.g. the emergence of the Islamic 
“State”) of geopolitical territories (Michaelowski, Chambliss & Kramer, 2010; See also 
Thibos, 2014). Despite the chaos and harm caused by the overthrow of existing regimes 
in the early years after 9/11, the U.S. executive continues to engage in regime changes 
(e.g. Kaddafi in Libya) and other “sovereign state crimes” including torture, 
extraordinary rendition (in violation of Article 49, clause 1 of the Geneva Convention 
Relation to Civilian Persons), and rectal force-feeding practices (Feinstein, 2014, p. 64; 
Hutchinson et al, 2013, p. 16). Perhaps most troubling is the recodification and 
conceptualization of torture in the now infamous Torture Papers whereby a group of high 
ranking lawyers in the Justice Department legalized previously illegal torture methods 
such as waterboarding (See Darmer, 2009; See also Dratel, 2005). The Torture Papers 
contributed to the institutionalization of physical torture on suspected terrorists to extract 
vital information (Henn, 2010, p. 25). All the aforementioned instances of state crimes 
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are not isolated incidents or solely illustrative of the Bush Administration. President 
Obama continues many of the same practices, including extraordinary rendition and 
detainee force-feeding, despite being highly critical of the Bush Administration while 
serving as a U.S. Senator (Hutchinson et al, 2013, p. 201).  
One aim of this thesis, then, is to addresses the gap in criminology and post-9/11 
knowledge by looking at how specific texts problematized and then rationalized state 
crime, discourses of self-determination, and policies that justified sovereign injustice 
including the systematic institutionalization of indefinite detention, torture and extra-legal 
killing. The emergence of sovereign state crime post-9/11 established instances of 
wrongdoing that have largely been ignored by criminal justice systems. Therefore, it is up 
to the social researcher to affix the stamp of criminality on the state.  
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5. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology for this research is rooted in Foucauldian discourse analysis, 
developed in the 1960's, during Foucault’s archaeological phase which later extended into 
his genealogical approach to assemblages of discourse, power and contingency (see 
Jessop, 2007). The fundamental methodological reference point (in this thesis) is the 
Archaeology of Knowledge (2002). This text establishes the methodological principle of 
discrediting “secret origins” in accounting for the “already said” (Foucault, 2002, pp. 27-
28). It uncovers historical ruptures within orders of discourse, while restoring the 
statement to discursive and frequently ideological specificity (Foucault, 2002, p. 204). 
What is deemed and deployed as “true” manifests a will and claim to power; domains of 
knowledge only exist within an accepted enunciative field (See Foucault, 1994b, p. 13; 
2002, p. 234).  
I. Data Sources: 
This project conducts an archaeological and genealogical examination of the Yoo-
Flanigan Memo, President Bush’s November 13th Military Order, and the February 7th, 
2002 Executive Order. These pertinent texts were not randomly selected but were 
purposely targeted. Yoo-Flanigan constituted the surfaces of emergence for a juridico-
political discourse of unfettered presidential jurisdiction that violated the U.S. 
Constitution, military and international law (See Henn, 2010, p. 30). By way of example, 
Yoo-Flanigan’s claim of presidential plenary authority as Commander-in-Chief was used 
in justifying enhanced interrogation methods employed during the War on Terror (Clarke, 
2008, p. 18; Passavant, p. 564; Rumsfeld, 2003a, p. 68).  
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President Bush’s Military Order institutionalized new discourses and practices for 
captured prisoners. The constitution of military commission contravened existing 
constitutional, military and international law (Meyer, 2007, p. 49). To demonstrate, court 
proceedings, including pre-trial detention, pre-trial procedure, post-trial procedure and 
appeals are determined at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense despite it being 
congressional (Article 1, S.9, Cl. 8 and 9) and judicial (Article 3, S. 2 and 3) vested 
powers pursuant to the U.S. Constitution (Cutler, 2005, p. 59; Henn, 2010, p. 77). 
Moreover, the February 7th, 2002 Executive Order authorized the unilateral executive 
suspension of the Geneva Conventions and in doing so, eliminated existing provisions 
against torture. The Executive Order established discourses and policies that denied 
international human right protections against torture. Those discourses are indicative of 
discontinuities and ruptures that then manufactured new discursive regimes and practices 
(See Shaub, 2011).  
The formation of enunciative modalities and rules of formation determine which 
statements are made and considered to be “true” or “effective” within the order of 
discourse. The power/knowledge dynamic of post-9/11 discourse concerning “unlawful 
combatants” are indicators of institutional sites and position of speakers (i.e. the President 
within the Oval Office). It considers how categorical subjects emerge as a result of 
contingent battles for domination which in turn reflect law as a dominant discursive 
formation (see Datta 2007). In response to the 9/11 attacks, enunciative modalities 
problematized the emergence a new enemy (i.e. unlawful combatant) and the sovereign-
subject.  
II. Archaeology, Genealogy and Foucauldian Methodology: 
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In undertaking a Foucauldian discourse analysis, I am also attentive to the differences 
between Foucault's archaeological and genealogical approach. In a rare instance, Foucault 
addressed the relationship between the two in a 1983 interview. According to Foucault, 
the main difference consists of “method and goal” (Mahon, 1983, p. 105). Archaeology is 
the methodological framework for research whereas genealogy is the “reason and target 
of analyzing discursive events... our knowledge, our societies, our type of rationality, our 
relations to ourselves and to others” (Mahon, 1983, p. 105). The genealogical method 
exposes the contingent historical conditions in which veridical discourses are tactically 
deployed rather than simply repeating the discursive unity and “empty sameness 
throughout the course of history” (Foucault, 1994f, p. 118). The archaeologist uncovers 
the discursive rules for discursive and object formation (Datta, 2008, p. 241). I attend to 
both the archaeological and genealogical sensibilities.  
A discursive formation is a collection of similar statements with respect to the 
same object of knowledge, independent of form and time (Foucault, 2002, p. 31). To 
clarify, a statement reflects a “complex web of rules” that establishes which expressions 
are discursively meaningful and taken to be “true” (Foucault, 2002, p. 110). A 
precondition for a statement is its connection to an enunciative field, between the 
relations of a statement and spaces of differentiation (Foucault, 2002, p. 182). It must 
have substance, support and a place (Foucault, 2002). Post-9/11 discourses concerning 
unlawful combatants are regarded as a series of finite and limited statements pertaining to 
pre-emption, risk and uncertainty. President Bush’s (2001a, p. 1) statement (in his 
Military Order) that “it is not practicable to apply in military commissions ... the 
principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal 
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cases” established post-9/11 legal/political discourses of pre-emption, indefinite detention 
and a new military justice system in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(Cutler, 2005, p. 57; Henn, 2010, p. 32; Meyer, 2007, p. 49).  The post-9/11 discursive 
formation marginalized traditional modes of liberal protections such as due process while 
producing a series of statements concerning risk, containment and preemption.  
A discursive formation depends in part on the formation of a specific “object,” 
(i.e., the objectification of some specific socio-historical facet of human existence). 
Surfaces of emergence describe the first condition of this formation and describe fields 
prior to the emergence of the object (Foucault, 2002, p. 44). The objective of an 
archaeological undertaking should not be the object itself but the overlaps, 
discontinuities, and tensions that exist prior to the emergence of an object within the field 
of “knowledge.” A detainee in the War on Terror, for example, was only classified an 
unlawful enemy combatant subsequent to object formation. 
Next, the “authorities of delimitation” are specific classes of subjects that 
authorize, delimit, designate, name and define the object (Foucault, 2002, p. 42). These 
authorities (which include legal, executive and medical experts) designate what can and 
cannot be said within a discourse, functioning as agents for what counts as “true. For the 
purposes of this study, the operational definition of a 9/11 authority of delimitation is a 
legal or political expert engaged in the formation of expert discourse about state conduct. 
In the case of unlawful combatant political/legal discourse, executive authorities create 
“discourses of truth” (Hunt and Wickham, 1994b, p. 42) whereby systems of legal rules 
determine objects, subjects, and designations of true and false.  These planes/grids of 
specification classify, divide and contrast objects within the discourse (Foucault, 2002, p. 
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42). In the case of 9/11 discourse, the planes differentiate between national security, due 
process and war.  
The formation of concepts is determined by three elementary levels: succession, 
coexistence and intervention (Foucault, 2002, pp. 56-58). The first elementary level 
establishes a set of rules in the schemata which allow recurring elements to constitute 
conceptual validity (Foucault, 2002, p. 60). Forms of coexistence include: the field of 
presence (all valid statements within the discursive formation); concomitance (valid 
statements outside the particular discursive formation); and the field of memory 
(statements that no longer have validity) which functions to permit and exclude concepts 
(Foucault, 2002, p. 60). Last, procedures of intervention operate by defining the rules and 
techniques by which the discourse may rewrite, translate and systemize statements and 
differ according to the particular discourse (Foucault, 2002, pp. 58-59). These elementary 
levels coexist in defining a system of conceptual formation. An analysis of these levels 
does not provide an understanding of the conceptual system but provides an insight into 
the rules of discursive regularities (Foucault, 2002, p. 191). It enables the researcher to 
discover how a statement may reappear or no longer remain relevant in the singularity.  
The formation of enunciative modalities and strategies also contribute to the 
formation of statements. These include the right to speak, the institutional sites and 
position of subjects contributing to the institutionalized production of truth (Foucault, 
2002, p. 108). Legal statements are made by lawyers and judges within specific 
institutional sites such as the Department of Justice or Department of Defense. The 
sovereign representative or academic are in a unique position of overlooking the 
population and statements. In doing so, the position of the subject shapes and oversees 
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the objectivized human subject(s) rendered visible and being observed. Investigating the 
strategies of discursive formations and problematizations contributes to the analysis of 
why certain concepts and objects form and attain discursive significance whilst other do 
not (Foucault, 2002, p. 110). When two competing incompatible theories or themes 
emerge with similar surfaces of emergence, why does one legitimately establish itself 
while the others fail? 
The Foucauldian method approaches normative claims of truth and good/bad with 
a sceptical gaze. Foucault was a devoted sceptic of both knowledge and universalism; he 
believed universal claims were tied to the unsubstantiated Enlightenment doctrine of 
humanism (Gutting, 2005, p. 149). Contrarily, normative and veridical claims of truth are 
the product of the discursive constitution of objects, concepts, strategies and enunciative 
modalities that guide the production of the truth (Foucault, 2002, p. 186). The 
archaeological aim is to ask how a particular knowledge was constituted, deployed and 
with what consequences or “effects” (Foucault, 2002, p. 163). The Foucauldian method is 
not concerned with what makes a discourse “legitimate, or makes it intelligible, or allows 
it to serve in communication” (Gordon, 1991, p. 59). It does not explain why a subject is 
good or bad but consists in asking how the assumptions, notions and practices were 
established (Foucault, 2002); to wit, the “righteousness” post-9/11 torture programs and 
the suspension of due process are irrelevant. Instead, the goal is to uncover how post-9/11 
discursive deployments concerning the formation of unlawful combatants devoid of 
rights and plenary presidential power were formulated, deployed and with what effects. 
This methodology describes and analyzes ruptures and discontinuities in the statements 
surrounding its origin and truth claim. This study analyses novel configurations of power 
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and domination, meanings and actions indicated by texts within 9/11 discourse (See 
Veyne, 2010, pp. 12-14).  
A Foucauldian approach uncovers the conditions that exist in uncovering the 
claim to true and false (Veyne, 2010, p. 74). The production of truth is controlled, 
prearranged, and circulated (Foucault, 2002, p. 216) alongside “multiple forms of 
constraint” (Foucault, 1994f, p. 131). Statements only gain legitimacy and are deemed as 
actualized discourse, after specific conditions and qualifications are met (Foucault, 2002, 
p. 225). The production of truth is linked to structures of power relations that declare 
alternate truth as lies, errors and absurd irrationalities (Foucault, 1994b, pp. 11-12; Weir, 
2008, p. 376). This “will to truth” is intricately linked to “systems of exclusion” and 
delimitation (Foucault, 2002, p. 219).  Therefore, the truth is nothing more than a game 
whereby systems of domination manufacture the correct way of thinking, feeling and 
acting in accordance with its production (Foucault, 2010, pp. 386-388). In doing so, valid 
and repeated truths are the result of systems of dominations that then produce and attach 
personal significance (techniques of the self) and value to its formation.  
Post-9/11 discourses can be understood as particular instances of 
problematizations since they involve the “domain of acts, practices, and thoughts 
that…pose a problem for politics” (Foucault, 2010b, p. 384). The Foucauldian approach 
is concerned with the games and regimes of truth, relations of power and forms of that 
relation to others. This approach does not seek to invalidate the fact that a certain group 
of individuals attacked the Twin Towers and the Pentagon. Instead, it aims to address the 
dual problematizations of unlawful combatants and plenary presidential power, 
articulated and constituted through post-9/11 discourse. It seeks to understand how the 
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surfaces of the 9/11 truth game created the conditions of unlawful enemy combatants, the 
emergence of the power over life and death and lawful indefinite detention.  
III: Immanent Critique 
This work is also anchored in a productive and critical engagement with works that are at 
times very theoretical in nature. The nature of theoretical work of this kind itself warrants 
methodological reflection. Here, I articulate my genealogical hermeneutics and 
demonstrate how I understand and aim to evaluate texts and theory on their own terms. 
To be clear, I employ an immanent critique, or critique of knowledge, in understanding 
and explicating Foucauldian genealogical and archaeological sensibilities in accordance 
with a discursive analysis of post-9/11 texts. Generally, an immanent critique is 
concerned with uncovering frames of references that establish conditions or fields of 
knowledge and claims of truth (Habermas, 1972, p. 7). At the same time, an immanent 
critique is normative because it produces arbitrary alternatives to a given reality and in 
doing so, accepts a normative conception of truth and/or the good (Antonio, 1981, p. 
333). The problem of subjecting knowledge to doubt finds its origins in Kantian and 
Hegelian theoretical traditions and this thesis shares in that critical spirit (See Habermas, 
1972; See also Pearce, 2013). Foucault himself, drawing on the Nietzschean 
radicalization of critique, holds that “we need a critique of all moral values” (Nietzsche, 
1956, p. 155) and that discursive formations produces “the light” (Datta, 2008, p. 60) or 
“things said” from which subsequent statements are made (Foucault, 2002, p. 234). The 
genealogical method records historical events outside of singular finalities or aims 
(Foucault, 1977c, p. 76) whereas archaeological sensibilities “illuminate” the connections 
between knowledge, practices and discursive objects (e.g. unlawful combatant). The 
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archaeological and genealogical critique is crucial in forming and implementing my own 
hermeneutics in interpreting Foucauldian and Agambenian texts and post-9/11 executive 
orders.  
 I employ my hermeneutics to analyze key texts on their own terms rather than 
impose universalizing judgements of right/wrong and good/bad. Therefore, my thesis 
employs both Foucauldian analytical tools and an immanent critique. My thesis uncovers 
normative abuses of U.S. state power and its claims of good/evil but I do not provide an 
alternative set of principles for governing the world. That is not to say that I do not have 
normative scruples, I do, but I try to analyze texts according to their own coherence and 
use of concepts (Pearce 2013). I do not assume to know the truth nor presume that origins 
are moments of “greatest perfection” (Foucault, 2010c, p. 79). Instead, I use my 
hermeneutics to critically inspect the logics, limits and gaps in Foucauldian and 
Agambenian theoretical systems. I argue that the internal logics of Foucault’s and 
Agamben’s theoretical toolboxes are inadequate in critically explicating and 
understanding the “darkest” deployments of state power at Guantanamo Bay. By way of 
example, I illustrate how discourses and logics of liberal governmentality and biopolitical 
sovereignty fail to properly explain instances of rectal force-feeding and battle lab 
experimentation on detainees. I understand that existing theoretical scholarship cannot 
account for all actualizations of state power. Instead, I advance and develop my 
hermeneutics in developing my conceptual analysis of the “security-sovereign” to partly 
explicate the emergence of post-9/11 governmental logics and practices.  
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6. FOUCAULT CONTRA AGAMBEN 
I. Introduction 
This chapter provides a critical theoretical assessment of Agamben’s and 
Foucault’s models of power as a basis for analysing and explaining the relation obtaining 
between the sovereign and unlawful combatants. Agamben’s book Homo Sacer: 
Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1998) and the State of Exception (2005) draw heavily on 
Foucauldian concepts, including sovereign power and biopolitics. These books have been 
exceptionally influential in academia as conceptual models for critical analyses of 
American responses to the 9/11 attacks (Mountz, 2013). While Agamben’s uses of 
Foucauldian concepts have been reviewed and assessed (both positively and negatively), 
this chapter undertakes its own critical exploration of Agambenian theory. This chapter 
also examines Foucault’s multi-dimensional analysis of modern power, from medieval 
deployments of sovereign power to modern assemblages, apparatuses, mechanisms, and 
tactics illustrative of “liberal governmentality” that guides the conduct of conduct. This 
section uses concepts by both thinkers to develop a theoretical foundation for analysing 
and explaining the increase of presidential powers and the deployment of controversial 
interrogation methods used by American authorities while fighting the War on Terror.  
My aim in this chapter is to demonstrate how the juridical sovereign functions 
alongside a binary rationality; the sovereign established an elaborate system for 
prohibiting conduct but also constituted the production, authentication and validation of 
regimes and discourses of truth (Foucault, 1994b; 2003). I also discuss the transformation 
from sovereign, monarchical power to a new art of government: “the reason of state.” By 
art of government, I do not mean how governors govern, but the “different objects, 
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general rules, and overall objectives of a government rationality” (Foucault, 2008, p. 3). 
By rationality, I refer to the discourses, means, objectives and instruments guiding state 
governance (Dean, 2010, pp. 119-120). It is particularly important to examine how 
specific problematizations of state strength and populations produced three great 
assemblages that secured and enhanced a network of force relations (i.e., “security 
assemblages”). Third, I discuss the emergence of liberal governmentality and its 
associated tactics and logics of governance. Of particular importance is the operation of 
security apparatuses, namely, the deployment of practices of pre-emption, containment 
and elimination (Deukmedjian, 2013, p. 55). Fourth, I assess Agamben’s conceptual 
analysis of biopolitics and sovereignty. In doing so, I argue that Agamben’s conception of 
the political sphere largely stems from his theoretical analysis of the case of the Roman 
homo sacer and the sovereign decision over “bare life” (Agamben, 1998; Gratton, 2006). 
Last, I discuss the limitations of Agamben’s analyzes of biopolitics and sovereignty. At 
issue are his theoretical conflation of biopolitics and sovereignty, and his totalizing 
analysis of the re-emergence of the Leviathan. 
A. Foucault and Agamben: A Brief Explication: 
The central argument advanced by Agamben (1998, p. 6) is the production of the 
biopolitical body that is constituted by both the ancient and now modern biopolitical 
sovereign. The main aim of the sovereign is to designate between those included 
(political subjects) and excluded (sacred man) from the polity. For Agamben, this “zone 
of indistinction” is the “original activity” and aim of sovereignty (Agamben, 1998, p. 6). 
In this sense, sovereignty and biopolitics are not separate deployments of power but 
operate alongside one another in designating between bare life and biopolitical tactics of 
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“taking life” or “letting live.” Agamben’s theoretical contributions diverge from 
Foucault’s analytics of power (especially work from his middle period) that places the 
productive “micro physics of power” and tactical deployments of discursive power as his 
central theoretical arguments (Foucault, 1977b, p. 34; See also Gratton, 2006). However, 
Foucault’s later works, particularly his Lecture Series on Security, Territory, Population 
(2007), concerns new political rationalities illustrative of a new “series of knowledge” 
and “governmental apparatuses” (Foucault, 2007, p. 144; Jessop, 2007). The 
governmentalized state, together with the emerging form for problematizing political 
rationality in the 16th century, is an “ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, 
analyzes and reflections, calculations and tactics” that allow for specific deployments and 
rationalizations of power (Foucault, 2007, p. 144). In the later, genealogical part of his 
career, Foucault shifted his focus from the analysis of discursive formations and how they 
shape experience and existence, to discourses, practices, bodies and power shaping action 
(Datta, 2008; Dupont & Pearce, 2001; Jessop 2007).  
While there are gaps in Agamben’s and Foucault’s conceptions of power (as with 
any theoretical endeavour), they nonetheless provide critical tools useful for analyzing 
deployments of state power. This chapter provides an important theoretical examination 
and account of the numerous knowledges, technologies, and tactics of American foreign 
policy post-9/11. While Agamben’s analysis concerning the re-emergence of sovereign 
power post-9/11 has been unfairly criticized in my view, it remains important to inspect 
his work. I argue that Agamben provides a compelling and critical conceptual 
contribution to the understanding of sovereign power, one worthy of theoretical and 
methodological consideration.  
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II. Foucault: 
Foucault’s position on power is multi-faceted and complex. He rejected a general theory 
of power, a priori assumptions and hidden unities (Dupont & Pearce, 2001; Jessop, 2007, 
p. 36).  To be clear, he rejects a macro, substantive theory of power whereby all power 
relations stem from the state (Power, 2011). Instead, his analytics of power function in 
accordance (Power, 2011) with a “multiplicity of force relations” and the formation of 
complex chains and systems (Foucault, 1978, p. 92).  Modern power does not consist of 
“homogenous domination” (Foucault, 2003, p. 29) illustrative of a single sovereign or 
dominant class over others but functions alongside “multiple bodies, forces, energies, 
matters, desires, thoughts, and so on,” constituted through unrelenting forms of 
domination and subjugation (Foucault, 2003, p. 28). In this sense, power is distributed 
throughout the social body and social relations (Foucault, 1978, p. 93) and should be 
methodologically apprehended in accordance with a “nominalist analytics of power” 
(Jessop, 2007, p. 35; Datta 2007). Power cannot be specifically situated in specific 
institutions or structures but is moulded in localized ways by intersecting and connected 
tactics, formed neither by particular persons, classes nor organizational bodies (Foucault, 
1978, pp. 94-99). Power is administered via techniques, technologies, strategies and 
mechanisms of domination (Deukmedjian, 2013, Hunt & Wickham, 1994). Most 
importantly, power is de-centered and circulates through networks of relations (Foucault, 
1977, p. 220 Jessop, 2007, p. 34). It transforms “useless” and disparate bodies into 
productive forces (Foucault, 1977, p. 148; Jessop, 2007, p. 35).  
Foucault is critical of the positivist approach to law in which it is treated as being 
representative of “rules backed by sanctions”. He instead focuses on the authentication, 
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transmission and production of truth illustrative of the sovereign/judicial institution (Hunt 
& Wickham, 1994, p. 41). The main reference point for Foucault is sovereign power as it 
emerged in the middle ages and was extended into what he calls the “Classical Age,” that 
corresponds to the rise of Absolutist Monarchs.  
The medieval monarchy in Western Europe emerged during an era of instability 
and heterogeneous claims to power as “agencies of regulation, arbitration, and 
demarcation” in constituting order and centralization (Foucault, 1978, pp. 86-87). The 
medieval sovereign functioned in accordance with a twofold system of power; the 
sovereign monopolized the power over life and death and established a discursive regime 
of right, violence and law (Foucault, 1978, p. 89). In doing so, the juridical sovereign 
manufactured classifications of wrongs (acts committed against the state and especially 
his/her person and capacity to rule), designated themselves as injured parties and 
demanded compensation for offences against juridico/political sovereign (Foucault, 
1994b, p. 43). It also established a complex system (i.e. the “inquiry”) for determining 
polemic, strategic and linguistic “facts” (Foucault, 1994b, p. 3). In constituting the 
“inquiry,” the juridical sovereign constituted complex regimes for determining truth, 
error, right and wrong (Foucault, 1994b, p. 5). The inquiry established itself as a “form of 
power management and exercise that, through the judicial institution, became, in Western 
culture, a way of authenticating truth, of acquiring and transmitting things that would be 
regarded as true” (Foucault, 1994b, p. 52). Acts deemed as being wrong and illegal by the 
medieval sovereign were placed in a “position of hatred, contempt, or fear” (Foucault, 
1994b, pp. 11-12). In this sense, medieval monarchies did not solely function as 
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centralized systems of unfettered violence (often associated with the medieval sovereign) 
but also operated alongside discourses of truth.  
The discursive system of sovereign right introduced above not only prohibits 
conduct (thou shall not) but also engages in the production of truthful statements 
(Foucault, 1978, pp. 88-89; Hunt & Wickham, 1994, p. 44). While the modern exercise of 
power is administered in mechanisms, techniques, technologies and tactics fundamentally 
in opposition to the sovereign model, the sovereign system of right (Foucault, 1978, p. 
89) has yet to be removed from public discourse (Foucault, 2003, p. xvii). That is to say, 
the medieval system of right has been transferred to the modern juridical sovereign (I 
conceptualize this classification as a high ranking executive, legislative and judicial 
official in the liberal state). Instead, the sovereign system of right (near absolute “right” 
to rule over his/her principality) has been transferred to liberal constitutionalism in “the 
establishment of an explicit, coded and formally egalitarian juridical framework, made 
possible by the organisation of a parliamentary, representative regime” (Foucault, 1977, 
p. 222). The constitutional system, representative of governmental restraints against the 
citizen and the rule of law, produces a false consciousness of entrenched individual rights 
(Hunt & Wickham, 1994, p. 63) while disguising the deployment of “micro physics of 
power” (Foucault, 1977b, p. 34) and all-out liberal wars and abhorrent genocides (See 
Foucault, 1978. p. 135; Dean, 2010, pp. 166-168). Individual legal rights are used as 
tactics for public argument while disguising new forms of juridical sovereign rights and 
biopolitical domination over the population (Foucault, 1980, p. 108; Foucault, 2003, p. 
28).   
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Sovereign power has not been completely displaced from public discourse and 
governance. The sovereign spectacle is merely one of many rationalities, tactics, and 
technologies of power. Liberal constitutionalism and the rule of law do not eliminate the 
violent right of the sovereign; instead, expert political/legal discourse manufactures the 
legality, subsequent discourses and techniques of institutionalized killings and legal 
and/or civilized torture (Rosso, 2014, p. 386). The sovereign right to rule his/her territory 
has been transferred to the legitimacy of the liberal state to use extraordinary measures 
against purported existential threats to secure state sovereignty (Foucault, 1977b; 2007). 
What this suggests is that sovereign deployments of power do not operate at the margins 
of liberal rule but are instead delegated to politicians, judges, lawyers and executive 
officials. Authorities of delimitation within the legal/political enunciative field constitute 
true discourses concerning unlawful combatant that then rationalize and authorize violent 
exercises of state power against those deemed to be evil doers or security threats.  
A. Sovereignty and Raison D’état: 
Sovereign power dominated medieval Europe until roughly the sixteenth century. 
Sovereign power was largely deployed as “a means of deduction” - taking things away - 
(Foucault, 1978, p. 136) and was exercised over a clearly defined territory (Dupont & 
Pearce, 2001, p. 128). Sovereign power concerned itself with a right over the seizure of 
things, including time, bodies and life (Foucault, 1977b; 1978, p. 136). The threat or 
deployment of the public sword signified the sovereign’s “right to kill” and its right to 
refrain (Foucault, 1978, p. 136).  Sovereign power functioned as an “exercise of terror” 
and the offender’s body embodied the symbol of unrestrained royal violence (Foucault, 
1977b, p. 49). The sovereign right justified the deployment of violence over his/her 
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enemies, both domestically and abroad (Foucault, 1977b, p. 48). Despite this, the 
deployment of sovereign power was restricted to defending the monarchical crown and 
his/her territory (Foucault, 1978, p. 135), legal codes, and constitutions (Foucault, 2003; 
2008).   
Sovereign power is often discussed in governmentality studies in association with 
the “spectacle of the scaffold” (Foucault, 1977b, p. 32; Lippert, 2005, p. 68). Despite this 
trend, this point also associates sovereign power to the suspension of law (Lippert, 2005, 
p. 68). Foucault states that, “[the] sovereign was present at the execution not only as the 
power exacting the vengeance of the law, but as the power that could suspend both law 
and vengeance” (1977b, pp. 53). In this regard, the sovereign wielded his/her monopoly 
to punish the aspiring regicide or suspend the sentence (Foucault, 1977b, pp. 53-55). 
Classic sovereign power can thus be regarded as being both the monopoly over violence 
and the means to deploy the exception (Dean, 1994, p. 123; Lippert, 2005, pp. 69-70; 
Schmitt, 1985, p. 5). That is to say, the sovereign right over vengeance includes not only 
his/her right to kill but also the right to suspend the law. Therefore, the medieval 
sovereign ruled both by decree and by the suspension of the law. I argue that the basis for 
both juridical application and suspension has been transferred to liberal state power.  
In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, sovereign power slowly shifted and 
transformed into disciplinary regulation and normalization that problematized the conduct 
of unproductive persons (Foucault, 1994g, p. 215; 2007). During the sixteenth century, 
the concept and practices of raison d’état emerged to deal with problematizations of state 
strength, statistics and police/policy science (Dupont & Pearce, 2001; Foucault, 2008, p. 
5). The concept of raison d’état regarded continued expansion of state resources, 
 41 
 
populations and self-preservations as its highest priorities (Foucault, 2007, p. 288). Of 
particular importance was the state’s ability to actualize the force of law to protect itself 
(Foucault, 2007, p. 263). In the event of a purported existential threat to itself, the state 
deploys extraordinary measures to ensure its continued existence (Foucault, 2007, p. 
261). Coup d’état and the state’s suspension or transgression of existing legal codes 
establishes the reason of the state (Foucault, 2007, p. 263).  
The rationality of raison d’état concerns the “art of governing states” grounded in 
a new political rationality (Foucault, 1994h, p. 314). The political rationality of raison 
d’état is based on principles and logics of preserving, maintaining, and developing a 
“dynamic of forces” for the sake of inter and intra-state competition (Foucault, 2007, p. 
296).  For Foucault, the preservation of a dynamic of forces can be traced to specific 
historically contingent conditions. First, the sovereign was concerned with increasing 
his/her wealth, resources, and territory for the sake of the realm whereas the state sought 
to increase its intrinsic wealth and potential power (Foucault, 2007, p. 294). Second, 
sovereign confrontations were fought in the name of the monarch with “blood [as] a 
reality with a symbolic function” (Foucault, 1978, p. 147).  In securing relations of force, 
the military and policy, two great security assemblages, developed to maintain and 
increase state influence and power (Foucault, 2007, p. 296). Military and police 
assemblages produced and deployed “political arithmetic” (Foucault, 1994i, p. 408) to 
“increase combine, and develop forces…that will make it possible to identify what each 
state’s forces comprise and their possibilities of development” (Foucault, 2007, p. 315). 
Political arithmetic (or statistics) advanced the state’s knowledge of itself; police and 
military assemblages developed internal, external and statistical data from other states 
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(Foucault, 1994h, p. 317; Foucault, 2007, p. 315). In doing so, the police and military 
assemblages constituted the emergence of a political rationality of force relations. 
The military assemblage consists of two inner-state permanent organizations: 
military diplomatic relations and the organization of a professional army (Foucault, 2007, 
p. 312). While diplomatic relations were deployed to ensure the balance of power among 
European states, the professional military operated to thwart foreign invasions and 
increase state influence beyond its borders (Foucault, 2007, p. 311). While the military 
assemblage functions to secure equilibrium outside the state’s borders, the emergence of 
the second assemblage, the science of the police, aimed to facilitate the proper internal 
functioning of the state.  
The problematization of police concerned “everything, anything, and everyone 
within a jurisdiction” (Datta, 2008, p. 194; See also Foucault, 2007, p. 319) to ensure the 
order, maintenance and his subject’s well-being (Gordon, 1991, pp. 9-10). During the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the police administered the following: education 
and proper determination of employment; directed the “dregs of society”, which 
encompassed the poor, the unemployed and the old; the proper functioning of the state 
economy which included the control of markets, trading and commodities; and territorial 
space (Foucault, 1994h, p. 318). Law, order and public safety were only considered 
secondary mechanisms of a new political power to supply the state with “a little extra 
strength” and equilibrium (Foucault, 1994h, p. 319). Man only existed insofar as his 
utility to the state; the state willed him to work, eat, produce and die (Foucault, 1994h). 
The entirety of existence for individuals, populations and the state was its political 
relationship to the state.  
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B. Liberalism and Governmentality: 
While the reason of the state and its political rationality focused on increased state 
strength, which dominated political discourse from the latter half of the sixteenth to the 
eighteenth century, an emerging art of government developed to criticize and oppose it. 
The rise of liberal rationality emerged from the problematization of government and how 
best to “economize” the exercising of power (Foucault, 1997, p. 44).  Liberal rationality 
sought to limit the size and scope of government intervention and establish clear limits of 
governing. Modern liberal governance sought to govern less but not “too little, and thus 
failing to establish the conditions of civility” (Rose, 1999, p. 71). In doing so, liberal 
governance established new institutional bases (i.e. surfaces of emergence) of objects of 
rule, targets of intervention and discourses that were incompatible with the model of state 
interference found in raison d’état (Foucault, 1994d). Newly constituted economic 
rationality played a significant role in the development of governmentalized societies 
based on the contingent and heterogeneous factors involving: 
the history of pastoral power, 16th century anti- Machiavellian treatises                             
on government, the formation of late 16th and early 17th century art of                       
government… doctrine of  reason of the state and its associated political 
rationalities/knowledges, including the technology of police…. the emerging                      
object of population, its subsequent articulation as a political problem, and                       
corresponding associations with disciplinary, political economy, biopolitics                  
and biopower; liberalism, and its associated mechanisms of self-regulation                      
and apparatuses of security (Dupont and Pearce, 2001, p. 126).  
Liberal governmentality functions “as a group of relations of power and techniques which 
allow these relations of power to be exercised” (Foucault, 1996, p. 410). It does not only 
refer to political rationality and management but also directs and leads individual and 
collective action (Foucault, 1994g; Rose, 1999, p. 70). Its basic functioning can be 
summarized in three interconnecting types of government: “The art of self-government, 
connected with morality; the art of properly governing a family, which belongs to an 
economy; and finally, the science of ruling the state, which concerns politics” (Foucault, 
1994g, p.  206). In this sense, the proper functioning of a state includes individual self-
care, self-reflection and self-examination, the proper functioning of political economy 
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and the practices and principles of a good government (Dean, 1994, p. 177; Foucault, 
1994g, p. 207). It functions as a “mode of action upon the actions of others” (Foucault, 
1994d, p. 341) by directing the potential conduct of children, families, schools, police and 
political economy among other institutional domains. Foucault’s concept of 
governmentality attends to systems of thinking about the world and (Gordon, 1991, p. 3) 
specific “organized ways of doing things” (Dean, 2010, p. 18) with the overall aim to 
guide or effect individual and collective conduct (Gordon, 1991, pp. 2-4).   
Foucault’s concept of governmentality is primarily concerned with considering 
“the right disposition of things” (Foucault, 1994g, p. 208). Liberal governmental 
rationality is concerned with the objects it directs and manages; it aims to develop and 
foster a knowledge of the potential of things in relation to the population (Dean, 2010). It 
fundamentally differs from those of sovereign power and reason of the state due to the 
atypical connection with securing and developing populations. Above all else, population 
and liberal political economy becomes the “ultimate end of government” (Foucault, 
1994g, p. 216). To clarify, Foucault does not conceptualize political economy as the 
creation or production of wealth and resources but the organization and distribution of a 
“self-limitation of governmental reason” (Foucault, 2008, p. 13). Political economy 
developed against the rationality of raison d’état and in favour of governing less. Most 
importantly, economic rationality is concerned with success and failure and the effects of 
governmental intervention into the disposition of things (Foucault, 2008, pp. 13-16). The 
possibility for the optimal economic disposition of economic problematizations, things 
and populations is made possible by the development and analysis of statistics 
administered by the science of the police (Foucault, 1994g, pp. 212-215). The police 
functions to shape the happiness, health, birth and death rates of the population (Dean, 
1994; Foucault, 1994g; 1994h) while simultaneously problematizing governmental 
intervention.  
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The governance of populations is primarily administered by apparatuses of 
security that regulate behaviour through ranges of tolerances rather than targeting and 
correcting minor behaviour (Deukmedjian, 2013, p. 54; Hunt & Wickham, 1994, p. 54). 
Apparatuses of security function by limiting deployments of governmental intervention in 
private life, the family and the economy. It guides rather than determines individual 
conduct by acknowledging the need to “not govern quite so much” (Foucault, 1997, p. 
29). At the same time, when the risk threshold becomes intolerable, apparatuses of 
security are deployed “through practices of pre-emption… containment, displacement 
and elimination” (Deukmedjian, 2013, p. 55). Apparatuses of security operate similarly to 
warfare in pre-empting, containing and eliminating potential risks (Deukmedjian, 2013, 
p. 55). Therefore, security discourse resembles sensibilities found in both the laissez faire 
governing of liberal governmentality and sovereignty; it does not seek to disrupt or 
correct minor behaviour but employs extraordinary measures, including the right to take 
life, in eliminating purported risks. While the mentality of governing over a territory has 
been displaced to that of governing things and conduct of conduct, the head of the 
sovereign has yet to cut off (Datta, 2008, p. 222). Instead, the tactics or “telos of 
governmentality has been partially filled by the concern with security” as a sovereign 
value (Datta, 2008, p. 222).    
C. Foucault on Biopolitics:  
During the latter half of the eighteenth and beginning of nineteenth century, a biopolitical 
technology and rationality of power emerged alongside new government rationalities. It 
developed out of the classical period and combined rationalities and techniques of 
sovereignty, administrative discipline, governmentality and security (Dean, 2010, pp. 
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119-125). The primary purpose, finality and function of biopolitics is to ensure the 
proliferation of life at the level of human subjects and populations (Foucault, 1978, pp. 
136-144). It objectivizes, improves, prolongs and enhances human life (Foucault, 2003, 
pp. 243-249). In problematizing population and life as its object and primary purpose, 
biopolitics reserves the right to deploy the ancient sovereign power to “foster life or 
disallow it” (Foucault, 1978, p. 136).  
 The power over life developed from two distinct forms. First, biopower power 
sought to enhance and optimize the individual body; mechanisms and techniques of 
biopower are deployed to harvest productive and docile bodies into efficient economic 
units (Foucault, 1978, p. 139). This “anatomo-politics,” “centered on the body as a 
machine: its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities… the parallel increase of its 
usefulness… and its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls” 
characterizes discipline (Foucault, 1978, p. 139). Disciplinary institutions including 
schools, armies, prisons, and hospitals target and correct undesirable conduct to 
manufacture a disciplined mass that obeys as if the action were innate (Foucault, 1977, p. 
166). Second, biopolitical technologies of power dealing in the aggregate “population,” 
aim to target and operate at the level of biological species (Foucault, 1978). It is 
concerned with the propagation of populations and operates to ensure and improve 
“health, sanitation, birth rates, longevity, and race” (Dean, 2010, p. 99). This power 
deploys the science of police and political arithmetic to establish statistics of birth and 
death rates, longevity, fertility and so on to preserve and improve human life at the levels 
of individuals and populations (Foucault, 2003, p. 243). 
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Biopower, the specific combination of biopolitics and anatomo-politics, uses 
totalizing mechanisms and techniques at the level of individual bodies and populations. 
This government of “all and each” (Foucault, 2007, p. 129) was founded in the “Pre-
Christian East” (Golder, 2007, p. 165); the pastor attended to his entire flock while caring 
for each individual member (Dupont & Pearce, 2001, p. 127; Foucault, 1994h, pp. 308-
311; 1994d, pp. 333-334). Technologies of pastoral power multiplied and transferred to 
the church and eventually to the “field of political sovereignty” over men (Golder, 2007, 
p. 168) that problematized life as an object of governance (Foucault, 2003, p. 254).  
How then can a power that problematizes life and the well-being of “all and each” 
as objects of governance develop into biopolitical killing machines? Historical and 
contemporary examples including National Socialism (i.e. Nazis) and the current War on 
Terror demonstrate that the “shepherd-flock game,” whereby the biopolitical rationality 
of preserving and enhancing “us,” renders those biologically different as parasitic and/or 
undesirable (Dean, 2010, p. 166). This realization was actualized by the Nazis who 
institutionalized medical experiments and a Final Solution to rid the world of Jews 
(Dean, 2010, p. 167; Peukert, 1993, pp. 236-242). Reeling from the 9/11 attacks, the 
United States transformed Guantanamo Bay and CIA black sites into “battle 
laborator[ies]” (Denbeaux et al, 2015, p. 39) whereby low ranking detainees were (and 
continue to be) systematically tortured and pushed “to the boundaries-mentally, 
physically, and psychologically” to produce more efficient torture techniques (on future 
high ranking enemies) for the purposes of battlefield data collection and protecting 
American lives (Denbeaux et al, 2015, p. 39; Singh, 2013).  
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While biopolitical initiatives are formulated “in the interests of “national well-
being” (Rose, 1999, p. 39) it also constitutes the necessary justification for the 
establishment of biological racism. Biological discourse appraises, measures, optimizes 
and qualifies between desirable and “degenerate… individuals and subpopulations” 
(Rose, 1999, p. 39). It classifies, designates and hierarchizes between superior and 
inferior human subtypes (Dean, 2010). Inferior bodies must be left to die to preserve and 
protect those that must live. For Foucault, this relationship is not only political one but is 
instead it is based on the biopolitical necessity to eliminate problematized enemy races 
(Foucault, 2003, p. 257).  
The classification of humans based on biological differences allows for the 
calculated “scientific” identification and extermination of entire races and populations. 
Foucault (1978; 2003) has told us that the classification and proliferation of life:  
over living beings as living beings, and its politics, therefore, has to be                               
a biopolitics. Since the population is nothing more than what the state                               
takes care of for its own sake, of course, the state is entitled to slaughter                            
it, if necessary. So the reverse of biopolitics is thanatopolitics                                        
(Foucault, 1994i, p. 416).  
In ensuring the proliferation of a desirable race, the state functions to eliminate those 
deemed undesirable. By undesirable races, I refer to humans deemed “unworthy of life” 
(Dean, 2010, p. 164) and that ostensibly pose a “danger to the biological existence” to 
constituted human subtypes hierarchies (Foucault, 1978, p. 137). In doing so, biopolitics 
does not put an end to the sovereign right to kill; rather, it intensifies and transforms it by 
linking it with racism and security (Foucault, 2003, p. 249; Dean, 2007).  
 The “dark side” of biopolitics establishes the necessary conditions to eliminate 
those who represent a biological risk to superior human subspecies. In dehumanizing 
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biologically inferior human beings, the sovereign right to kill is integrated into 
biopolitical discourse, problematizations, and technologies of power (Dean, 2007, pp. 
158-175; Foucault, 2003, pp. 254-260). The classification and designation of “less than 
human” subtypes forms the foundation for genocidal killing machines (Dean, 2010, pp. 
163-165; Foucault, 2003, pp. 254-260). The biopolitical state engages in “ethnic 
cleansing” and holocausts that slaughters entire classes, groups and races (Dean, 2010, p. 
164). While there is a certain restraint in the sovereign right to kill (sovereign 
inoperativity), “the biopolitical imperative knows no such restraint” (Dean, 2010, p. 164).  
 The “darker side” of biopolitics does not merely designate and classify inferior 
subspecies for the purposes of elimination. It also dehumanizes the enemy as 
“degenerates, abnormal and feeble minded members of an inferior race” ostensibly 
undeserving of basic legal and human right protections (Dean, 2010, pp. 164-165). The 
designation of inferior human races justifies and authorizes “medical and psychological 
techniques and disciplines… to open the private concerns of bodies to public control” 
(Dean, 2010, p. 164). Death represents the failure of torture; the biopolitical monstrosity 
maintains the power to let die at all costs (Rejali, 1994, p. 91).  
 In summary, Foucault is critical of the negative representation of power that acts 
through sanctions and violence. Instead, he argued that governmental models of power 
emerged during the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries that fundamentally differed from 
traditional representations and practices of sovereign power. In problematizing life as an 
object of modern governance, biopower developed as a technology that sought to ensure, 
preserve and enhance human life. I argue that this technology of power (that protects and 
preserves each and all) can partly account for the dehumanization of the unlawful 
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combatant in post-9/11 governance. I argue that the unlawful combatant is classified as 
an inferior, racialized and historical throwback of the uncivilized savage (Mégret, 2005, 
p. 282). In doing so, pertinent post-9/11 texts dehumanized the unlawful combatant in 
similar fashion to the civilization process undertaken by earlier European settlers (See 
Bush, 2002b). In doing so, practices of indefinite detention and torture are justified 
because unlawful combatants are deemed to be inferior human subtypes (Kellner, 2006, 
p. 45).  
III. Giorgio Agamben on Biopolitics and Sovereignty: 
Agamben’s work in Homo Sacer (1998) and the State of Exception (2005) almost 
exclusively concerns itself with biopolitical sovereignty (Gratton, 2006).  These works, 
particularly Homo Sacer, draw from Foucauldian conceptual resources about sovereignty 
and biopolitics in History of Sexuality, and Foucault’s Lecture Series Society Must Be 
Defended (1975-76) and Security Territory, Population (1977-78). In Agamben, 
Foucault’s focus on the health of populations and biological life come to be seen as 
concerns of the sovereign, gradually displaced as a problem of “the government of men” 
(Agamben, 1998, p. 3). The state is obliged to care for the population while techniques of 
subjectivization bind the individual subject to her/himself and the state (Agamben, 1998, 
p. 5). In this way, the state’s primary goal is to ensure biological life, by subjecting it to 
the control of its jurisdiction while also shaping individual subjectivity to take care of 
itself. The state’s political techniques and individual subjective technologies create a 
“political double bind” whereby the convergence of power between the state’s totalizing 
power and individual subjectivity remains unclear (Agamben, 1998, p. 5). This 
conceptualization of power is problematic for Agamben (1998) because Foucault fails to 
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develop a general theory of power. Agamben argues that Foucault’s political double bind 
of biopolitics and individualization creates a zone of indistinction (Agamben, 1998, p. 5). 
This indistinction is a central foundation for Agamben’s concepts of zoé (bare life) and 
bios (political or social life).  
 Agamben’s intellectual foundation is grounded in Aristotelian philosophy 
whereby the good life and the highest good are to be realized within the polity (Agamben, 
1998; Aristotle, 1978). For Aristotle, those outside the polity are not human but instead 
are either beasts or gods (Aristotle, 1978, 1, II, 16; Norris, 2005, pp. 3-4). Agamben was 
influenced by this conceptual distinction between those included and excluded from the 
polity (Norris, 2005, pp. 3-5).  
 Agamben (1998, 2005) conflated Foucault’s clear distinction between sovereignty 
(power to let live and make die) and biopolitics (power to let die and make live) in 
conceptualizing biopolitical sovereignty. The inclusion/exclusion indistinction between 
these two concepts influenced his understanding and classification of Foucault’s “blind 
spot” between the totalizing political techniques of the state (police, sovereignty and 
biopower) and individual subjectivity. While Foucault purposely chose not to 
conceptualize a “unitary theory of power” (such as uniting his analysis of biopolitics and 
sovereignty) Agamben conceptualized this as his fundamental theoretical gap (Agamben, 
1998, p. 5). Agamben thus combined Foucault’s “unfinished” configurations of power in 
first few pages of Homo Sacer (both Foucault’s totalizing and individualizing analytics) 
in forming the basis of his theoretical analysis of the sacred man and the analogous zone 
between the juridical sovereign and biopolitical models of power (Agamben, 1998, p. 6). 
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The result of his analysis was the combination of the totalizing and individualizing power 
of the biopolitical sovereign.  
A. The Paradigm:  
The paradigm is the central “methodological approach to problems” to elucidate a “larger 
historical context” (Durantaye, 2009, p. 218). For Agamben, the paradigm operates to 
render visible a historical contextual problematic, much like Foucault’s deployment of 
Bentham’s figure of the panopticon: it illustrates a way to exercise power-knowledge 
(Durantaye, 2009, p. 224; Raulff, 2004, p. 610). The paradigm is neither particular nor 
universal and “neither general nor individual” (Agamben, 2002, para. 12). This 
methodological approach does not try to explain the whole but instead explains a 
framework of a historical/philosophical whole (Agamben, 2002, para. 31). The historian 
analyzes and describes a historical singularity whereas Agamben employs the 
paradigmatic methodological approach in understanding a group of historical facts and 
structures in applying it to current problems (Durantaye, 2009, p. 223). In this way, 
Agamben is less interested with understanding the past and more concerned with the 
present (Durantaye, 2009, p. 223). Agamben’s paradigmatic methodology uses the homo 
sacer, the state of exception and the camp in applying historical phenomenon to 
contemporary western governance (Durantaye, 2009, p. 223). These “exemplary places” 
(Agamben, 1998, p. 10) have been criticized “as series of wild statements” (Laclau, 2007, 
p. 22) in mirroring the inclusion/exclusion of biopolitical sovereignty and the camp 
(Norris, 2005, pp. 273-275). Contrary to his critics, Agamben’s conceptual analysis of the 
biopolitical sovereign paradigm is not a series of wild statements nor does it favour “what 
it contests” (Norris, 2005, p. 264). I argue that Agamben’s historical deployment of 
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exemplary places provides a unique perspective into the darkest, ubiquitous, yet largely 
unanalyzed features of modern governance: the sovereign biopolitical decision over bare 
life.   
B.  Homo Sacer: 
  For Agamben, and contrary to Foucault, sovereign power and biopolitics cannot 
be separated. The indistinction between politically qualified life (bios) and bare life (zoé) 
constitutes the biopolitical sovereign (Agamben, 1998). Agamben claims that the bios 
(political life) and zoé (simple fact of being alive) indistinction dates back the Aristotelian 
and Ancient Greek traditions (Finlayson, 2010, pp. 105-106). The ancient tradition of 
bare life represents two different archaic figures: the zoēas representative of “biological 
life of human beings” and the homo sacer (Eduardo & Villamizar, 2014, p. 82). For the 
purposes of this thesis, I conceptualize bare life as the sovereign decision to exclude those 
from the polity (Gratton, 2006, p. 452). The sovereign ban and designation over bare life 
finds its origins in “ancient Germanic law” (Agamben, 1998, p. 104) and the wolf-man 
who is “neither man nor beast and, who dwells paradoxically within both while belonging 
to neither” (Agamben, 1998, p. 105). The ancient Germanic wolf-man thus embodies 
bare life; transgressors of communitarian law are rendered outside of public protections. 
Just as the wolf-man belongs to neither beast nor man, he “who has been banned” is 
neither “inside nor outside the juridical order” (Agamben, 1998, p. 29). The wolf-man is 
banned from the city and subject to a condition similar to that described by the Hobbesian 
notion of the state of nature (Agamben, 1998, pp. 105-106). The sovereign ban does not 
allow the wolf-man to reside inside the city but casts him away on the threat of the public 
sword to live amongst the wolves and live under the constant fear of a painful death.    
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 The ancient Roman figure of homo sacer embodies the sovereign’s constitutive 
and original power to remove the political subject (i.e., specifically the “citizen”) from 
the polity. Yet, the homo sacer remains within the polity by means of his/her very 
exclusion (Agamben, 1998): the relation between the sovereign and the polity is 
constitutive of the type of subject of the ban. Although Agamben does not explicate the 
difference between the wolf-man and homo sacer, they are dissimilar. The wolf-man is 
banished from the polity and lives in the state of nature whereas the homo sacer remains 
within the community. He is both inside and outside the law and remains in a zone of 
indistinction between bare and political existence (Agamben, 1998). The homo sacer is 
entirely stripped of his/her highest good and political existence and is rendered a life of 
“naked existence without significance” (Datta, 2010, p. 170). He is not only naked by 
means of being excluded from the polity but he is also deprived of being fit for sacrifice 
(Ojakangas, 2005, p. 10). In this sense, he is doubly excluded; his death may neither be 
classified as homicide nor sacrifice (Agamben, 1998, p. 82). The sovereign decision, 
actualizing the original juridico-political structure that constitutes what is included and 
excluded from political life in the polity (Agamben, 1998, p. 19), subtracts the homo 
sacer from both “human and divine live” (Agamben, 1998, p. 82).  
 Agamben’s conception of biopolitics distinguishes between bios and zoe (Murray, 
2008). In doing so, biopower (combining biopolitics and anatomo-politics) does not seek 
to ensure and enhance life as one find in Foucault. Rather, this “negative eschatology” 
operates to include political existence and classify bare life (Datta, 2010, p. 172). In other 
words, Agamben’s conception of sovereignty (biopolitical sovereignty) functions in 
accordance with the constant threat of unconditional death without sacrifice or juridical 
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concern (e.g., homicide); we are already designated as homo sacer and deemed politically 
and religiously naked (Datta, 2010, p. 172; Ojakangas, 2005, p. 9).  Therefore, 
Agamben’s conception of biopolitics dramatically differs from Foucault. Agamben’s 
understanding of biopolitics is the antithesis of the power of attending to the care of 
populations. The following passage from Homo Sacer illustrates this difference well:  
Along with the emergence of biopolitics, we can observe displacement and 
gradual expansion beyond the limits of the decision on bare life, in the state        
of exception, in which sovereignty consisted. If there is a line in every modern 
state marking the point at which the decision on life becomes a decision on death, 
and biopolitics can turn into thanatopolitics, this line no longer appears today as a 
stable border dividing two clearly distinct zones (Agamben, 1998, p. 122).  
In Agamben’s work, biopolitics is thanatopolitics because every decision to ensure life 
becomes a decision to take it (1998, p. 122). The exercising of sovereign power to 
constitute an “exception” is not a war against a biological race but a negative power 
actualizing the sovereign ban from Antiquity to the modern state (Murray, 2008). The 
“exception” is an ambiguous zone “separating between bare life and legal existence” 
(Lemke, 2005, p. 8).  
 Agamben (1998, p. 123) uses the origin of the modern example of the writ of 
habeas corpus (British Act of 1689) in illustrating the ambiguous inclusion/exclusion 
zone of the political subject. The modern British state established the corpus as the 
democratic political subject/object, with the guaranteed and fundamental right to be 
brought before a judge. To be clear, the constitution of this political subject was not used 
to limit the exercise of judicial power. On the contrary, it was used to compel the corpus 
“to the violence of sovereign decision” (Gundogdu, 2012, p. 7).  In valorizing the corpus 
and life, the sovereign state extended its biopolitical sovereign decision in the designation 
of bare life (Gundogdu, 2012, p. 9). The corpus thus both embodied and transformed the 
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ancient power over bios and zoé (Ojakangas, 2005, p. 7) into modern exercises of state 
power.  Therefore, the modern democratic state’s power over the corpus shatters bare life 
and distributes it within individual sovereign bodies (Agamben, 1998, p. 124). The 
sovereign subject literally embodies a part of the sovereign; he resigns to the state the 
absolute authority over his bodily dominion (Agamben, 1998, p. 125). The sovereign 
need not designate bare life since the corpus “is a body of the city… of the so-called 
political part” (Agamben, 1998, p. 125). The newly founded sovereign power designates 
a complete and total bare life over those in the polity.   
The ancient and classical world distinguished between “nature” that belonged to 
the gods, and political life (a domain of human, collective affairs). In contrast the modern 
state fully incorporates both. Constitutional codes (designating the natural rights of 
humans) authorize the inclusion of the political subject’s natural life into the nation-state 
(Agamben, 1998, p. 127). Humans are subject to the unfettered discretion of sovereign 
deployments of power due to the designation of bare life into the nation-state (Agamben, 
1998). Therefore, the modern political subject is nothing more than a “living dead man” 
(Agamben, 1998, p. 131). He exists on the threshold “that belongs neither to the world of 
the living nor to the world of the dead” (Agamben, 1998, p. 99).  
C. The “State of Exception”: 
In his book State of Exception (2005), Agamben draws on the concept of sovereign 
exceptionalism advanced by German political theorist Carl Schmitt in explicating the 
suspension of constitutional and international law in post-9/11 governance (Lippert & 
Williams, 2012, p. 53). According to Schmitt, the sovereign “is he who decides on the 
exception” and is constituted by “severe economic or political disturbance that requires 
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the application of extraordinary measures” (Schmitt, 1976, p. 5). An emergency is 
defined as imminent danger and hostility towards the state or the constitution (Schmitt, 
1997, p. 32).  The emergency suspension of the existing legal order results in a 
government with more authority and a citizenry that enjoys fewer rights and freedoms 
(Rossiter, 1948, p. 5). Despite this, the sovereign decision is neither outside the law nor 
arbitrary since it provides order and a “force-of-law” (Gratton, 2006, p. 453; Schmitt, 
1985). The force-of-law is the exercise of violence by the executive branch without the 
support of the other branches of government (put differently, one is dealing in direct 
actualizations of state repression). Therefore, Schmitt’s conception of sovereignty and the 
decisionism that actualizes its constitutive power to subjugate humans runs contrary to 
Agamben. Schmitt argues that the sovereign decision omits further decisions and instead 
replaces law with unrestrained forms of power and violence whereas for Agamben, the 
sovereign (like the homo sacer) is both inside and outside the juridical order. In this 
sense, Agamben’s and Schmitt’s respective conceptions of the exception are not one and 
the same; Schmitt’s understanding of the exception does not relate to a zone of legal 
indistinction. Contrarily, the sovereign is the supreme, legally independent power and his 
authority to produce law need not be based on existing law (Schmitt, 1985, p. 17). In the 
event of an existential threat to the state, the executive suspends the existing order and 
established a new form of right/Recht. 
Agamben’s concept of the “state of exception” (loosely based on Schmitt’s early 
conception) remains extraordinarily influential as a means to explain contemporary 
American responses to terrorism. The transgressions evinced by law post-9/11 are a 
consequence of the “biopolitical significance of the state of exception as the original 
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structure in which law encompasses living beings by means of its own suspension” 
(Agamben, 2005, p. 3). Agamben compares the zone of indistinction constituted by the 
sovereign to post-9/11 deployments of power. According to Agamben (2005), the 
terrorist attacks on 9/11 created the necessary conditions for the re-emergence and re-
asserting of sovereign power in contemporary liberal governance to which it is ostensibly 
anathema.  
The suspension of constitutional and international law generates legal lacunae 
whereby the executive branch applies the force of law without legal/legislated substance. 
For example, President Bush’s Military Order on November 13th, 2001 “which 
authorized the ‘indefinite detention’ and trial by “military commissions” acted outside of 
constitutional authority in establishing a biopolitical state of exception (Agamben, 2005, 
p. 3). Detainees subject to the Military Order embody the living dead man described in 
Homo Sacer and are entirely deprived of legal, political and religio-cultural significance 
(Agamben, 2005). Agamben (2005) and Dean (2007) relate the treatment and designation 
of the unlawful combatant in the War on Terror as being comparable to the Jews in Nazi 
concentration and death camps. Both Jews and unlawful combatants lose their legal 
identity and citizenship and reach the “maximum indeterminacy of bare life” (Agamben, 
2005, p. 4).  
Agamben’s critical analysis of “the camp” illustrates his position on the radical 
realization of contemporary thanatopolitics. The camp is a space devoid of legal 
substance (Agamben, 1998; 2000; 2005). Those within the camp are stripped of political 
rights and are subject to absolute violence, torture and death. For example, during World 
War II Jews were subject to infinite political possibilities including: systematic 
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deportation, institutionalized scientific experimentation, torture and a Final Solution to 
rid Europe of their existence (Agamben, 1998; Gerlach, 1998; Klaus, 2008). According to 
Agamben (1998, p. 173), researchers should not ask how the camp is actualized but 
instead  analyze juridical procedures and deployments of power that enable humans being 
to be so completely devoid of legal and political substance.  
IV. Agamben’s Theoretical Limitations: 
A. Homo Sacer: 
The first few pages of Homo Sacer acknowledge Foucault’s theoretical contributions to 
Agamben’s critical analysis of biopolitics and sovereignty. Despite this, Agamben’s 
conceptualization of biopolitics, sovereign power and bare life demonstrate an inadequate 
understanding of pertinent Foucauldian concepts. To begin with, Agamben’s concepts of 
bios and zoe are founded on the inclusion/exclusion structure of the polity. Since 
antiquity, the sovereign deploys his/her power to designate bare life; human beings are 
either granted political existence or denied the right. For Foucault, modern power, 
especially the pastoral qualities of biopower, guides the “conduct of conduct,” operating 
alongside technologies, specific knowledges and government logics that seek to produce 
productive social bodies. The Leviathan is a relic of the classical era that operates in the 
background of modern governmentality. Modern governmentality no longer operates to 
repress the social body (as per Agamben); rather, it directs “life” and “what people do” 
(Datta, 2010, p. 173).  
 Since the formation of new political rationalities during the sixteenth century, the 
administrative state, reason of the state and governmental models primarily problematize 
the individual body, the state and populations as objects of governance. While the ends or 
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“raison” of sovereignty is the continued rule over the principality, new governmental 
models seek to guide knowledge, discursive objects, self-conduct, people’s activities and 
political economy. In this sense, governmental action is concerned with what is 
“discovered” by the science of the police in establishing governmental statistics on 
health, longevity, sanitation and accompanying discursive formations (Datta, 2010). 
Agamben’s conceptual conflation of biopolitics and sovereignty disregards the basic 
tenets of emergent “modern, liberal” life in the Foucauldian analysis of biopolitics. In 
Foucauldian terms, then, modern biopolitics does not seek to repress and manufacture the 
living dead. 
 Indeed, Agamben’s conception of biopolitical sovereignty resembles Foucault’s 
extreme realization of biopolitics: thanatopolitcs. For Agamben, biopolitical power is the 
original self-manifestation of sovereignty. In something of a reversal of Foucault’s 
position, the main objective of biopolitics is the sovereign’s right to exclude and take life. 
Therefore, the “telos” of biopolitical sovereignty has nothing to do with the preservation 
of life. On the contrary, its finality is thanatopolitics; Agamben’s concept of biopolitics 
derives its theoretical position from the analysis of those excluded from the bios and “life 
not worthy of being lived” (Esposito, 2008, p. 134). For Foucault, technologies of 
anatomo-politics and the regulation of populations (biopolitics) do not distinguish 
between the bios and zoe. Disciplinary mechanisms aim to produce productive bodies 
whereas the science of police uses political arithmetic in ensuring and preserving the life 
of the population through health programs, birth rates, and safety measures. At this point, 
those rendered scientifically deviant may be separated and differently objectivized from 
the desirable population (Foucault, 2007, p. 9). In doing so, those excluded by means of 
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political arithmetic and biopolitics are systematically subject to a power that “foster[s] 
life or disallow[s] it to the point of death… at the biological existence of a population” in 
securing the life of desirable human subspecies (Foucault, 1978, pp. 137-138).  
B. State of Exception: 
Agamben’s claim that the sovereign decision and exceptionalism is the “dominant 
paradigm of government in contemporary politics” (2005, p. 2) signifies a totalizing and 
all-encompassing logic. For Agamben, the sovereign operates by distinguishing between 
zones of regular law, and zones of indistinction. Discourses of exceptionalism and the 
sovereign decision denote a privileged sovereign center whereby the modern head of state 
determines entire domains of governmental practice (Neal, 2006, p. 34). Agamben’s 
model of exceptionalism disregards the forms, techniques, discourses and technologies of 
modern liberal governance. The single sovereign does not operate as the “dominant 
paradigm of government” (Agamben, 2005, p. 2) in deploying its sovereign power over 
life in every facet of the state from purported existential threats to mundane governmental 
affairs (Lippert & Williams, 2012, p. 55). On the contrary, modern governmental 
discourse problematizes specific objects and subsequent regimes of practices, thinking 
and “organized ways of doing things” (Dean, 2010, p. 18). High ranking government 
officials or “petty sovereigns” manufacture expert discourse and designate particular 
modes of governance (Lippert & Williams, 2012, p. 55). The crux of the theoretical 
matter is this: Foucault’s conceptual analysis of governmentality and its accompanying 
reference to the multiplicity and heterogeneity of relations of domination, technologies 
and apparatuses renders the totalizing logic of sovereignty depicted by Agamben 
implausible as a theoretical position. Agamben’s totalizing sovereign logic generates 
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significant difficulties for the social analyst, for example, if sovereignty re-emerged 
subsequent to 9/11, what role did governmental power perform prior to the attacks? Was 
American governmental power suspended from the end of World War II until the 9/11 
attacks?  
 According to Agamben (2005, p. 4) the American response to the War on Terror 
represents the sovereign suspension of the law. Agamben (2005) refers to the enactment 
of the Patriot Act and detainee classification and treatment at Guantanamo Bay as 
instances of the sovereign decision. For him, President Bush operates in accordance with 
the inclusion/exclusion dichotomy whereby the unlawful combatant is confined to a zone 
of political indistinction, between political qualified and unqualified life (Lippert & 
Williams, 2012, p. 56). Detainees are at the mercy of new political/legal discourses and 
the re-emergence of sovereignty, existing as living dead men awaiting newfound legal 
categories and enhanced interrogation techniques (See Denbeaux, Hafetz & Denbeaux, 
2015, p. 4). Detainees exist outside the rule of law within a legal black hole (Steyn, 
2004). In doing so, I argue that the detainee can be neither properly conceptualized as a 
homo sacer nor as the ancient Germanic wolf-man. He resides neither within the polity 
nor in the state of nature. The unlawful combatant exists at the darkest, barest and purest 
reaches of zoé – a 45 square mile area outside of existing U.S. and international legal 
jurisdiction – (Johns, 2005, p. 619). In occupying a zone of legal indistinction – between 
existing legal standards and newly constituted codification that sheds every relation to 
law – (Agamben, 1998, p. 59), detainees are rendered to an existence of indefinite 
political possibilities including physical and psychological torture (Rosso, 2014), rectal 
force-feeding practices (Feinstein, 2014) and battle lab experimentation.  
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 Agamben’s theoretical application of biopolitics and sovereignty in the State of 
Exception disregards both Foucault’s earlier work on discursive formations shaping 
action and practice and his later genealogical emphasis of discourse and practice shaping 
one another (See Dupont & Pearce, 2001; See also Jessop, 2007). Sovereign power does 
not operate as a totalizing abstract logic encompassing every governmental domain; 
rather, it functions alongside discourses and practices of governance, other social 
relations, and institutions (Dupont and Pearce 2001; Datta 2007). For instance, the Yoo-
Flanigan Memo established specific institutional domains (“surfaces of emergence” 
[Foucault, 2002]) in which conduct is identified for both veridical and juridical discursive 
practice (Foucault, 1994b) for the establishment of biopolitical racism and subsequent 
unlawful combatant policies. High ranking government officials manufactured specific 
pertinent documents that then shaped particular discourses and regimes of practice (Neal, 
2006; Shaub, 2011). In short, the designation and classification of unlawful combatants as 
being ostensibly undeserving of fundamental legal rights is decidedly not the result of a 
single sovereign decision but the result of elaborate discursive regimes of determining 
truth, guilt, right and wrong (Baxter, 1996, Foucault, 1994b, p. 5). Pertinent post-9/11 
texts manufactured a discourse and subsequent biopolitical deployments of state power 
with respect to unlawful combatants. Those confined and targeted at Guantanamo Bay are 
subject to specific problematizations of necessity, security and anti-terrorism, contingent 
heterogeneous political rationalities and practices, and the “foster life or disallow it” 
(Foucault, 1978, p. 138)  
V. Conclusion: 
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A genealogical account of Foucault’s conceptual analysis of power is crucial to 
understanding the contingent discursive formation of “unlawful combatants” and the 
deployment of rationalities of rule and exercising of state powers. So, while the medieval 
sovereign is often associated with the prohibitive or negative elements of power (“thou 
shalt not” and “thou mustest”), the juridical sovereignty (defined as the monarch in 
medieval Europe, now transferred to governmental branches and executive authorities in 
liberal constitutionalism) also instituted an elaborate system (the inquiry) for determining 
right, wrong, truth and error. The monarchical inquiry has been transferred and 
incorporated within the modern governmentalized state and operates alongside 
technologies, tactics and discourses of truth. Modern deployments of power are made up 
by multiple and diverse procedures (not infrequently inchoate), analyzes, mechanisms, 
calculations and tactics that incorporate techniques of individualization (anatomo- 
politics) and totalization (biopolitics) (Datta, 2008, p. 222; Foucault, 2007, p. 109). While 
Foucault’s theoretical analysis of power has been extraordinarily influential, Agamben 
appropriates his concepts in a much different light.  
Agamben begins Homo Sacer (1998) by claiming that Foucault’s “political 
double-bind” between individualized subjectivity and biopolitical totalizing power 
creates a zone of indistinction. He used the zone as the basis for his conceptual analysis 
of biopolitical sovereignty and the homo sacer. For Agamben, the sovereign decision or 
ban is the original manifestation of the “juridico-political structure” (1998, p. 19). He 
employed the concept of the homo sacer and sovereign power as an explication for the 
American response to the terrorist attacks on 9/11. In his view, the extraordinary 
measures initiated by President Bush in the November 13th Military Order established the 
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re-emergence of sovereign power. Those confined to Guantanamo Bay lose both their 
legal identity and citizenship and are thus rendered to the barest of life (Agamben, 1998, 
p. 4). The President enjoys unfettered jurisdiction while detainees are subject to indefinite 
political possibilities of domination.  
Both Foucault and Agamben offer conceptual tools for explicating the purported 
increase of the power over death and the suspension of constitutional, international and 
military law post-9/11. While Agamben’s account of power is restricted to biopolitical 
sovereignty and its capacity to constitute bare life, Foucault’s analysis of power is 
illustrative of a complex system of force relations and techniques (Foucault, 1996, p. 
410). Although he does not disregard the medieval power over life and death, he 
theorized that it tends to remain firmly in the background in modern rule. In short, there 
are good theoretical and analytical reasons for preferring Foucault’s conceptualization 
and analytics of power as being more nuanced and persuasive. Modern deployments of 
power cannot be rationally reduced to being the expression of the single sovereign ban. 
Nonetheless, I contend that Agamben’s claim of sovereign re-emergence should not be 
discounted. Pertinent government texts subsequent to 9/11 transformed governmental 
practices away from the “conduct of conduct,” force relations and the power to make live. 
An increase of the right over death has been witnessed but it is not the result of a single 
sovereign decision and classification of people as homo sacer. Contrarily (as argued later 
on) the post-9/11 increase of sovereign power is due to specific veridical discourses (i.e., 
the Yoo-Flanigan, the Military Order and Executive Order) that problematized plenary 
executive power (in the form of petty sovereigns), the suspension of constitutional, 
international and military law, and the designation of the unlawful combatant outside of 
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existing legal standards. In sum, high ranking executive officials constituted true 
statements and discourses that justified the re-emergence and re-assertion of sovereign 
power.  
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7. RESULTS 
 This section analyzes and reflects on the discursive rationality of Yoo-Flanigan, 
the Military Order and the Executive Order. Although these documents were formulated 
by legal-political authorities in establishing specific modalities of thought and regimes of 
practice (i.e. increased presidential power and the deployment of military commissions), I 
am less concerned with constitutional legal analysis. Instead, I am more concerned with 
their discursive implications and effects, in particular, the normative games and wills of 
truth concerning classifications of legal/illegal, constitutional/unconstitutional and 
right/wrong.  To further clarify, a legal analysis of indefinite detention and torture in the 
thesis are secondary to newly constituted discursive effects, knowledge and practices in 
accordance with the emergence of the monarchical sovereign and unlawful combatants as 
discursive subjects/objects. This thesis thus considers and operationalizes liberal 
constitutionalism and post-9/11 governance as both operating within the normative “legal 
complex” (assemblage of legal practices, institutions, legal texts, judicial precedent, 
norms and authorities) that continuously transforms diverse discursive rules, logics and 
practices (Rose & Valverde, 1998, p. 542).  
I. Yoo-Flanigan Memo: 
I have organized my findings in subsections, highlighting specific elements pertinent to 
my theoretical and methodological framework. Subsection A examines the formation of 
an executive discursive regime of retaliation against individuals, groups and/or states 
suspected of involvement in the 9/11 attacks. At issue are the discursive effects of 
executive power against those not yet charged or convicted of wrongdoing. Subsection B 
outlines the surfaces of emergence regarding increased presidential authority in response 
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to the 9/11 attacks. I explore Yoo-Flanigan’s problematization of unfettered presidential 
authority as Commander-in-Chief in accordance with the declared national emergency 
subsequent to September 11th, 2001. Subsection C examines the preemptive war doctrine 
as outlined in the introduction of Yoo-Flanigan. I explore the determination and 
justification of preemptive war against the enemies of the United States. I analyze how 
the surfaces of emergence of presidential plenary power (i.e. sovereign discretion) formed 
the discursive rules and logics for the construction of an alternative military justice 
system, the transgression of the Geneva Conventions, and a newly constituted preemptive 
doctrine against detainees.  
A. Retaliation and Due Process: 
The Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) was passed by Congress on 
September 14th, 2001 and was signed into law four days later. The AUMF (2001, p. 1) 
was enacted to combat those who “planned, authorized, committed or aided” the 9/11 
attacks or harboured those responsible. Just seven days after the enactment of the AUMF, 
John Yoo issued the now infamous Yoo-Flanigan Memo. Yoo-Flanigan’s (2001, p. 1) 
determination that “the President has the constitutional power not only to retaliate against 
any person, organization, or State suspected of involvement in terrorist attacks on the 
United States, but also against foreign States suspected of harbouring or supporting such 
organizations,” formed a new way of thinking about presidential war power (Fisher, 
2011, pp. 178-180; Hutchinson et al, 2013, pp. 129-133). The retaliation against suspects 
is problematic in accordance with existing tactics and logics of liberal governmentality. 
However, the problematizing of post-9/11 rule and the framing of terrorism as an object 
of governance established the surfaces of emergence for suspected enemies undeserving 
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of traditional legal protections. Prior to Yoo-Flanigan, existing “legal complex[es]” (Rose 
& Valverde, 1998, p. 542) nominally designated suspects as innocent until proven guilty 
(Clarke, 2008, p. 18; Henn, 2010, pp. 31-33). Moreover, states and groups suspected of 
being involved in the 9/11 attacks or suspected of being able to commit future harm are 
not proper objects of retaliation in accordance with the liberal problematization of 
punishing after-the-fact criminality (McCulloch & Pickering, 2007, p. 633). Nonetheless, 
Yoo-Flanigan established the surfaces of emergence for a series of finite, delimited, yet at 
the same time, productive statements regarding the newly constituted discursive effects of 
state power against those not charged of wrongdoing in President Bush’s Military Order, 
the Executive Order and subsequent Torture Memos3.  
B. Sovereign Power:  
The Yoo-Flanigan Memo reflects a transformation of traditional executive power: 
[T]he constitutional structure requires that any ambiguities in the allocation                              
of a power that is executive in nature - such as the power to conduct                               
military hostilities - must be resolved in favor of the executive branch.                              
Article II, section 1 provides that "[t]he executive Power shall be vested                                
in a President of the United States." U.S. Const. art. II, § 1. By contrast,                              
Article I's Vesting Clause gives Congress only the powers "herein granted."                       
Id. art. I, § 1. This difference in language indicates that Congress's                            
legislative powers are limited to the list enumerated in Article I, section 8,                       
while the President's powers include inherent executive powers that are                      
unenumerated in the Constitution. To be sure, Article II lists specifically                       
enumerated powers in addition to the Vesting Clause, and some have argued                      
that this limits the "executive Power" granted in the Vesting Clause to the                      
powers on that list. (2001, p. 4). 
 
                                                           
3 The Torture Memos refers to a series of key texts primarily authored by John Yoo that legally authorized 
enhanced interrogation methods between 2001-2003 
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Despite the discursive discontinuity of legislative and executive deployments of state 
power with respect to war making powers4, the Memo argued that congressional authority 
is “limited to the list in Article I, section 8” whereas presidential power is vested in areas 
not specifically enumerated in Article 2 of the U.S. Constitution. In short, the Memo 
employed a discursive argument for unlimited presidential authority outside of 
enumerated powers whereas congressional authority is limited to the list specifically 
outlined as per Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. Moreover, the Memo 
established the institutional basis for unilateral executive discursive deployments of 
presidential power during wartime (with respect to foreign relations and criminal justice) 
irrespective of existing legal rules of congressional authorization. In doing so, I argue that 
the Memo established a post-9/11 legal complex of unfettered presidential jurisdiction 
(unfettered by codification) to initiate hostilities throughout the world.   
Newly constituted statements concerning plenary presidential power during times 
of war (as per Yoo-Flanigan) are conducive to Agamben’s conceptual analysis of 
presidential sovereign power in The State of Exception (2005). By way of example, Yoo-
Flanigan’s claim of appropriate presidential responses to national security concerns 
(Yoo, 2001, p. 17) established specific discourses and logics for the re-emergence of the 
absolute sovereign right (Foucault, 1978, p. 136). Almost all significant legal advice 
given to military and CIA personnel in accordance with battlefield and interrogation 
initiatives came directly from the “Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice” 
(Hutchinson et al, 2013, p. 119).  
C. Pre-emption:  
                                                           
4 The question of whether or not the President has the legal authority to unilaterally initiate hostilities is 
problematic and not a discursive historical unity as proposed in the Memo.  
 71 
 
In response to the 9/11 attacks, Congress and the executive signed the AUMF into law 
granting the President increased authority to protect the United States from future 
terrorist attacks. However, the AUMF (2001, p. 1) also restricted this power to those 
“those nations, organizations, or persons [the] [President] determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.”  Despite 
this, Yoo-Flanigan (2001, p. 1) claimed, “the President may deploy military force 
preemptively against terrorist organizations or the States that harbour or support them, 
whether or not they can be linked to the specific terrorist incidents of September 11.” 
While statements within the AUMF sought to limit the American response to those 
responsible for the attacks on 9/11, the Memo established surfaces of emergence for 
unilateral executive detention policies (i.e. the Military Order in November) and military 
action against any individual, group or state deemed to be enemies of the United States.  
 A main theme presented throughout Yoo-Flanigan is the declaration of unilateral 
presidential authority to preemptively attack any group or state irrespective of Al-Qaeda 
affiliation or link to the attacks on 9/11. Yoo explicates this position in the conclusion of 
the Memo: 
 Military actions need not be limited to those individuals, groups, or states  
 that participated in the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon:  
 the Constitution vests the President with the power to strike terrorist groups  
 or organizations that cannot be demonstrably linked to the September 11  
 incidents, but that, nonetheless, pose a similar threat to the security of the  
 United States and the lives of its people, whether at home or overseas  
(2001, p. 20).  
 
The question of whether or not a terrorist group poses a similar threat to the 9/11 attacks 
is left to the unique problematization of terrorism, necessity and national security by 
authorities of delimitation within the executive branch: the capacity for judgment and 
 72 
 
commands required for acting on a judgment rests in the president. Instances of terrorism, 
necessity and national security are only designated as such subsequent to discourse-object 
formation by those who are in a position to pose the problem of how to govern. A series 
of limited, constrained and marginalized statements surrounding objects of governance 
such as “plenary executive authority” or “terrorism” constitutes particular modalities of 
thought and governmental action. For example, the authority to “strike terrorist groups” is 
the result of the problematization of increased presidential authority. Yoo-Flanigan re-
asserted the sovereign right (authority) to strike enemies of the United States because 
high ranking executives (i.e. John Yoo) discursively and effectively, drawing on 
techniques of legal discourse, constituted the enemy as dangerous terrorists.  
The Yoo-Flanigan Memo established a series of statements that were later 
rationalized for the correct way of governing in a period characterized by fear, paranoia 
and purported existential threat (Henn, 2010, p. 30; Passavant, 2010, p. 565). The 
conflation of suspects and criminals, as illustrated in Subsection A was the “Archimedean 
point from which the Bush administration Office of Legal Counsel sought to undermine 
and systematically remove the terra firma of international humanitarian protection from 
those it labeled unlawful enemy combatant” (Henn, 2010, p. 32). The executive and 
judicial branches operationalized unlawful combatants (in early 2002 and 2004 
respectively) as members of a prohibited organization and/or engaged in hostilities 
against U.S. or coalition forces (Denbeaux & Denbeaux, 2006, p. 7). An executive 
“Working Group” was established by the Pentagon to address appropriate interrogation 
methods in anticipation of the invasion of Iraq and were advised to consider Yoo-
Flanigan as the central legal authority (Passavant, 2010, p. 565; Savage, 2007, p. 181).  
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In authorizing extraordinarily controversial interrogations powers for American 
authorities, the Working Group (2003, p. 50) cited the plenary authority of the 
Commander-In-Chief as per Yoo-Flanigan. The Yoo-Flanigan Memo thus established 
itself as the authoritative post-9/11 discursive resource for legitimizing extraordinary 
executive deployment of power.  
II: The November 13th, 2001 Military Order 
This section outlines President Bush’s November 13th, 2001 Military Order. I analyze the 
discursive deployments of the legal assemblage (practices, institutions, codes etc…) and 
the “narratives they engender” (Rose & Valverde, 1998, p. 542) rather than the 
legitimate/illegitimate claims of presidential authority. Subsection A analyzes legal 
discourses regarding military commissions in light of section 1(f) and 4(b)(c)(1) of the 
Military Order. Despite vested presidential authority as per Article II of the American 
Constitution [1788] to execute and not create law, President Bush enacted a new military 
justice system to deal with captured detainees – in accordance with apparatuses of 
security -. Subsection B examines the post-9/11 discursive formation of presidential 
authority to suspend judicial review of both the federal courts and the U.S. Supreme 
Court with respect to unlawful combatants. Section 7(b)(2) of the Order establishes the 
executive as the final arbiter or court of last resort in existing military legal discourse. 
Subsection C concerns humanitarian protections pursuant to section 4 of the Order 
afforded to detainees as it pertains to varying logics and tactics of governance. This 
section examines the protection of life and tactics of liberal governance. Subsections A, B 
and C distil the sum of governmental tactics encompassing an overall, yet unrecognized 
(at this point) strategy.  
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A. President Authority and Military Commissions: 
On November 13th, 2001, President Bush issued the Military Order for the purpose of 
establishing an alternative military justice system for non-citizens whom either he, or the 
Secretary of Defense, believed pose an immediate threat to U.S. national security:  
Given the danger to the safety of the United States and the nature of                               
international terrorism, and to the extent provided by and under this                                
order, I find consistent with section 836 of title 10, United States Code,                          
that it is not practicable to apply in military commissions under this                             
order the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized                                 
in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts (Bush, 2001a, p. 
1).  
 
The unilateral deployment of military commissions reflects Agamben’s conceptual 
analysis of a state of exception and the suspension of nomic games of truth concerning 
the rule of law. The Order institutionalized a justice system that suspended “principles of 
law” and “rules of evidence” in violation of military Court Martials, the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice and domestic U.S. criminal courts jurisdiction. Under the new justice 
system, traditional due process rights were abolished and suspects were referred to as 
“terrorists” (Bush, 2001a, pp. 1-4)  
The Military Order suspended the existing legal complex in the pursuit of newly 
constituted legal procedural practices. First, section 4(a) of the Order establishes that “an 
individual subject to this order, when tried, be tried by military commission” (Bush, 
2001a, p. 2). In employing conditional statements such as “when tried”, the Military 
Order established a discursive practice for the indefinite detention of  suspects, a practice 
that remains in effect to this day (Hutchinson et al., 2013, p. 13). Second, President Bush 
(2001a, p. 2) declared, “the Secretary of Defense shall issue orders and regulations, 
including pre-trial, trial, and post-trial procedures, modes of proof, issuance of process, 
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and qualifications of attorneys”. Therefore, the Military Order transgressed existing legal 
discourse, norms and practices concerning modes of trial and evidence (i.e.: hearsay 
evidence, habeas corpus relief, and competent and preferred legal counsel) in authorizing 
an alternate system of prosecuting purported wrongdoers (Cutler, 2005, pp. 67-68; 
Dickinson, 2002, p. 1434). In summary, the Military Order problematized and deployed a 
discourse that gave President Bush (and his executive) the unlimited power to constitute 
military commissions in violation of his constitutional authority (as President), the 
regular military justice system (Meyer, 2007, p. 49), and established alternative modes of 
criminal and international justice systems.  
B. Judicial Review 
The Military Order not only circumvented traditional military and criminal justice, it also 
established the President and his executive as the sole judicial authority. This realization 
is demonstrated as per section 7(b)(2) of the Order: 
The individual shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any                           
proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding                                                             
sought on the individual’s behalf, in (i) any court of the United States, or any                 
state thereof, (ii) any court of any foreign nation, or (iii) any international                        
tribunal (Bush, 2001a, p. 4). 
In problematizing terrorism and national emergency as objects of governance, the 
Military Order unilaterally established military commissions outside the traditional court 
structure (Henn, 2010, pp. 77-79). This realization can be considered the most critical 
departure from established legal-political discourse and deployments of state power in 
fighting the War on Terror. According to the Military Order, triers of fact and law5 are 
appointed by “the Secretary of Defense” (Bush, 2001a, p. 3) and consist of “three to 
                                                           
5 The judicial branch is traditionally responsible for determining questions of law and fact and not the 
Secretary of Defense 
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seven professional military officers” (Cutler, 2005, p. 76). Neither the American 
Constitution nor legislative codes, including President Bush’s earlier reference to section 
836 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (outlined as United States Code in the 
Military Order) in section 1(f) of the Order, give him the authority to overstep the 
Supreme Court of the United States as final arbiters of judicial review (Cutler, 2005, pp. 
187-190; Henn, 2010, pp. 78-79; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld [2004]). American legal discourse 
from constitutional ratification to the 9/11 attacks gives federal courts exclusive 
jurisdiction “involving possible offenses against the law of nations” (Henn, 2010, p. 78). 
In doing so, the Military Order posed a new problem of how to govern by constituting 
military commissions as the final arbiter of offences against captured detainees during the 
War on Terror.  
 C: Liberal Governance 
 While the Military Order can be criticized for constituting new legal discursive 
rules and government logics, the Order also established detention camps whereby “law 
and liberal proceduralism speak and operate in excess” (Johns, 2005, p. 614). To 
demonstrate, captured detainees pursuant of the Military Order are afforded rights as 
follows:  
 2(a) detained at an appropriate location designated by the Secretary of;  
(b) treated humanely, without any adverse distinction based on race, color,                    
religion, gender, birth, wealth, or any similar criteria; 
(c) afforded adequate food, drinking water, shelter, clothing, and medical                   
treatment; 
(d) allowed the free exercise of religion consistent with the requirements of such 
detention; and 
(e) detained in accordance with such other conditions as the Secretary of Defense                  
may prescribe. 
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Although the President unilaterally established detainee conditions outside of existing 
legal discourse, he nonetheless manufactured a territorially legal-political space 
respecting basic liberal protections (Bush, 2001a, p. 2). The Military Order is the result of 
authorities of delimitation within the Bush Administration that established the terrorist 
problem and military commissions as a solution. Therefore, the Order is the result of 
numerous “explanatory logics” (Rose & Valverde, 1998, p. 546), practices, hyper-
securitization (everything is considered in terms of extreme risk) and deployments of 
power (Dean, 2007, p. 192; 2010, p. 246).  The aforementioned liberal protections are the 
result of discursive unities, discontinuities, differing and clashes logics and legal/extra-
legal “processes and practices” (Rose & Valverde, 1998, p. 546). In this regard, liberal 
discourse amounts to one element among many in the legal assemblage of post-911 
governance.  
III. February 7th 2002, Executive Order: 
This section outlines the unilateral executive decision to suspend provisions of the 
Geneva Conventions Relative to Prisoners of War (hereafter, “GPW”) against suspected 
terrorists. Subsection A of this section concerns President Bush’s determination that the 
War on Terror requires a “new paradigm” and discursive deployment in accordance with 
laws of war (2002a, p. 1). Following this, Subsection B analyzes the legal-political 
discursive formation regarding President Bush’s claim of absolute presidential authority 
to suspend the GPW. Subsection A and B reflects the governmental programmes, 
rationalities and tactics that are deployed within the Executive Order.  
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A. A New Paradigm:  
The Executive Order manufactured an expert legal/political discourse whereby the 
executive unilaterally suspended the GPW and customary international law (Henn, 2010, 
pp. 127-134- Khan6, 2007 pp. 4-5). The newly constituted governmental rationality for 
suspending Geneva reads as follows: “Our nation recognizes that this new paradigm - 
ushered in not by us, but by Terrorists - requires new thinking in the law of war, but 
thinking that should nevertheless be consistent with the principles of Geneva” (Bush, 
2002a, p. 1). The Executive Order posed the problem of how to govern and then 
manufactured expert discourse and governmental logics in accordance with the newly 
formulated governmental paradigm. Prior to 9/11, terrorist attacks and networks were 
deemed to be illegal by sovereign states (Henn, 2010, pp. 127-128) and were considered 
to be “crime[s] against humanity” (Khan, 2007, pp. 3-4). Moreover, according to the 
Staff Statement (2004, p.1), the FBI (not the CIA or the military as was the case after 
9/11) was responsible for combating domestic terrorism and conducted “after the fact” 
investigations in “identify[ing], arrest[ing], prosecut[ing] and convict[ing]” suspected 
terrorists. Therefore, the new rationality was not ushered “by terrorists” but by the 
Executive Order (made by Bush and other high ranking executive officials) that 
problematized new discursive subject/objects and suspended the GPW, due process and 
prohibition against torture (Khan, 2007, p. 5).  
                                                           
6 Irene Khan delivered this speech as part of the Mitchell Lecture at the State University of New York at 
Buffalo Law School while occupying the position of Secretary General of Amnesty International 
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This path was not the only one available. For instance, Dr. Ron Paul7 introduced a 
bill into the House of Representatives on October 10, 2001 that granted Congress the 
constitutional authority to “grant letters of marque and reprisal to punish, deter, and 
prevent” future acts of terrorism pursuant to Article 1, s. 8, cl. 10 of the U.S. Constitution. 
The bill authorized the President to grant bounties to private U.S. citizens to capture Bin 
Laden and other Al Qaeda co-conspirators that were responsible for the 9/11 attacks 
(Paul, 2001, p. 4). This alternative governmental strategy proposed by Ron Paul 
demonstrates historically contingent discursive rules and events in association with the 
problematization of unlawful combatants and the unilateral executive decision to suspend 
existing legal discourses and practices. Paul’s bill sought to specifically target those 
responsible for 9/11 rather than engage in aggressive foreign occupations throughout the 
Near and Middle East and establish military detention regimes in violation of existing 
legality.  
B. The Suspension of the GPW 
By declaring post-9/11 governance to be a “new paradigm”, President Bush unilaterally 
suspended key provisions in the GPW: 
 2(a) I accept the legal conclusion of the Department of Justice and determine  
 none of the provisions of Geneva apply to our conflict with al-Qaida in  
 Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout the world because, among other reasons, 
 Al-Qaida is not a High Contracting Party to Geneva. 
 (b) I accept the legal conclusion of the attorney general… that I have the  
 Authority under the Constitution to suspend Geneva… but I decline to exercise 
 that authority at this time… I reserve the right to exercise the authority in this  
 or future conflicts. 
 (c) I also accept the legal conclusion of the Department of Justice and determine  
 that common Article 3 of Geneva does not apply... Article 3 applies only to  
                                                           
7 Ron Paul was a fourteen-term Republican Congressmen and three time presidential candidate. He was 
the founder of the Tea Party before it was hi-jacked by the corporate/neoconservative fascist oligarchy. 
His criticisms towards the military industrial complex and preemptive war could be considered the 
surfaces of emergence for the emerging shift of Republican foreign policy.  
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 armed conflict not of an international character.  
 (d) I determine that the Taliban detainees are unlawful combatants and therefore,  
do not qualify as prisoners of war under Article 4 of Geneva. I note that because                
Geneva does not apply to our conflict with Al-Qaida, Al-Qaida detainees also  
do not qualify as prisoners of war (2002a, pp. 1-2) 
 
President Bush unilaterally suspended key Articles of the GPW by claiming that “Geneva 
does not apply to our conflict with Al-Qaeda”. If the GPW does not apply, how could the 
Executive Order determine that detainees are unlawful combatants and therefore fail to 
qualify as prisoners of war pursuant to Article 4 of the GPW? Even if the President had 
the constitutional authority8 as Commander-in-Chief to suspend the GPW, he cannot 
apply them whilst suspending it (Art. 142, S. 3). In this way, the President acted both 
inside and outside existing legal discourses by unilaterally suspending the legal 
protections afforded to captured enemies in differentiating between unlawful combatants 
and prisoners of war (Henn, 2010, p. 129) and establishing an “alternative assemblage of 
legal practices” (Rose & Valverde, 1998, p. 542). In suspending legal protections for 
enemies, President Bush established a legal-political configuration that eliminated the 
protection against human rights abuses.  
  
                                                           
8 The President must have two-thirds of Senatorial support before making or withdrawing from treaties 
pursuant to Article 2, section 2 of the U.S Constitution 
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8. ANALYSIS 
This chapter outlines and reflects on the component parts of pertinent U.S. executive 
orders presented above. I explicate the composition of new political-legal statements 
dealing with unlawful combatants who exist in the geographic-spatiality of “the camp” 
(See Agamben, 1998, pp. 166-180; 2000, pp. 37-45,) and unlawful combatants. 
Subsection I explores the dualistic rationalities of “black letter” constitutional theory and 
the executive application of the law; the former is concerned with strict constitutional 
rules whereas the latter examines legal discourse alongside rationalities and will and 
games of truth. Subsection II critically explores the institutional basis of presidential 
authority in its capacity to preempt future harm in fighting “evil doers” and the “axis of 
evil.” The doctrine of “preemption and retaliation” against individuals, groups, and states, 
parallels the problematizations, discourses, and practices employed by criminal 
anthropologists in the 1890’s. Subsection III examines the re-emergence of “the king,” a 
figure of sovereign power and its mentalities, and the rise of contemporary political 
rationalities concerned with national security and populations in contrast to the earlier 
concern with maintaining rule over a territory (e.g., a principality). The tripartite analysis 
of legal discourse, preemptive rationality, and the purported emergence of sovereign 
power establishes the basis for a thorough examination and analysis of the discursive 
framing of War on Terror and unlawful combatants.   
I. Legal Discourse and Liberal Legality: 
The production and deployment of Yoo-Flanigan constituted the surfaces of emergence 
for exceptional discourses and practices on the part of the executive branch. Post-9/11 
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deployments of state power subsequent to the Memo were made possible by the "already 
existing discursive formation” of subjects, objects, enunciative modalities, authorities of 
delimitation, concepts, and strategies (Neal, 2006, p. 44). Yoo-Flanigan can thus be 
considered the discursive origin or unity of post-9/11 sovereign rationality by which the 
“infinity continuity of discourse[s]” (Foucault, 2002, p. 25) and deployments of 
extraordinary state power have become actualized. I do not mean that Yoo-Flanigan is the 
secret origin of post-9/11 exceptionalism; rather, Yoo-Flanigan is a landmark text 
whereby plenary presidential power was first enunciated within the post-9/11 juridico-
political field. 
A central theme discussed above concerns the legal limit of unilateral presidential 
deployments of state power. I will not conduct an archaeological excavation of “law” and 
thus use of unilateral presidential power since the Founding Fathers to the 9/11 attacks. 
Moreover, I am unconcerned with discourses of positive law and the 
legitimacy/illegitimacy dichotomy. Liberal theory is itself taken to be a specific discourse 
illustrative of the continuity between the “law, state and society” (Hunt, 1993, p. 142). 
Normative liberal legal theory, in which the rule of law9 is deemed to operate in excess 
and in unison throughout governmental branches and the population, fails to account for 
multifaceted interplay of relations, tactics and discourses illustrative of post-9/11 
governance. In accordance with the black letter application of liberal constitutionalism, 
the President does not have the constitutional authority to unilaterally initiate foreign 
hostilities, create a separate military justice system (Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 2004), and 
                                                           
9  Although “the rule of law” refers to many different notions (such as equality before and under the law), I 
focus in particular on the supremacy of constitutional and regular law over arbitrary law, the separation of 
powers pursuant to the U.S. Constitution and the supremacy of the Bill of Rights over Congressional and 
Executive Orders (See O’Donnell, 2004, pp. 32-34). 
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suspend the GPW (Henn, 2010, pp. 127-130). Nonetheless, since 9/11, President Bush 
initiated conflicts throughout the Near and Middle East irrespective of congressional 
authorization, unilaterally suspended the established military criminal justice and 
suspended international legal protections for captured prisoners.  
A. Legal Narratives:  
Ewick and Silbey (1999) offer a helpful analytical tool to supplement Foucauldian 
archaeological and genealogical sensibilities for examining the gap between legal theory 
and its application. Foucault’s conception of the “legal assemblage” (Rose & Valverde, 
1998, p. 542), much like Ewick and Silbey’s model, considers the complex multi-
dimensional relation between legal and non-legal forms of the legal complex (See 
Lippert, 2005, pp. 141-175). Their tripartite analysis differentiates among “before the 
law,... playing with the law… and up against the law” (Ewick & Silbey, 1999, pp. 1028-
1034). The first narrative conceptualizes law as the traditional strict application of legally 
formal, rational and hierarchical systems of established procedural rules (Ewick & Silbey, 
1999, p. 1028). The second narrative reflects law “as a terrain for tactical encounters” 
whereby new legal rules, uses, and application surface (Ewick & Silbey, 1999, p. 1031). 
The third narrative (up against the law) conceptualizes law as “arbitrary, capricious… 
[and] a product of unequal power” (Ewick & Silbey, 1999, p. 1034).  
Ewick and Silbey’s notions of  “before the law” and “playing with the law”  help 
one examine how the executive deploys extraordinary unilateral authority as 
Commander-In-Chief and designates detainees as being outside of traditional legal 
protection. In this respect, legal discourse functions in accordance with linguistic games 
and claims of truth.  It functions as a “discourse [of] regular set[s] of linguistic facts… 
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[and] as an ordered set of polemical and strategic facts” (Foucault, 1994b, pp. 2-3). The 
same logic can be applied in post-9/11 governance. On the one hand, the executive is 
bound by existing law and the limits of presidential powers in what Ewick and Selby 
conceptualize as “before the law.” On the other hand, pertinent executive texts (e.g.,. the 
Military Order) transformed and problematized the enemy as “a legally unnameable and 
unclassified being” (Agamben, 2005, p. 3) in protecting U.S. national security (Johns, 
2005, p. 629). In this regard, law reflects an interpretative, “brooding normativity” (Hunt, 
1993, p. 8) encompassing both established legal rules (i.e. the long standing tradition of 
the separation of powers) and emerging legal logics, rules and complexes.  
B. Law: A Nominalist Approach: 
Foucault’s nominalism helps one grasp the affectivity of legal discourses. Discursive 
objects exist alongside sets of rules for the formation of discourse and previously made 
statements, in short “the archive” (Datta, 2007, pp. 279-281). Post-9/11 legal discourse is 
not the result of clearly established legal standards whereby the President follows strict 
constitutional limits. Instead, (legal) discourse reflects a particular production of 
knowledge and political responses (Datta, 2008, p. 250; Neal, 2006, p. 33). Contrary to 
legal positivists, legal discourse does not possess a privileged historical continuity. 
Indeed, Executive Orders post-9/11 transformed political-legal statements in accordance 
with discursive strategies of sovereign power rather than employ constitutional codes and 
judicial precedent in advancing the case of presidential limits. In doing so, John Yoo 
employed obiter dicta10 in advancing the historical unity and application of plenary 
                                                           
10 Obiter dicta refers to statements made by the judiciary that is made in passing and not pertinent to 
important questions of legal fact. It is not normally considered important in future cases (Garner, 2009, p. 
1177) 
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presidential authority during times of war (Fisher, 2011; Passavant, 2010, p. 559). In this 
respect, I argue that law functions as a tactic in post-9/11 governance.  
 Post-9/11 surfaces of emergence constituted legal discourse and regimes of 
“exceptional state prerogatives” (Neal, 2006, p. 33) as the domain of the exercising of 
sovereign power in the guise of the “executive”. Yoo-Flanigan, the Military Order and 
Executive Order suspended established legal standards and substituted it with alternate 
normative domains, tactics, discursive practices, and political/legal rationalities. In this 
regard, the War on Terror is governed by both existing liberal constitutionalism (and 
legal theory) and new legal/political discourse distinct from existing standards (See Dean, 
2007, p. 183). Thus, in this respect, genealogical sensibilities are apt in highlighting the 
agonic forces in play. 
The juridical enunciative field reflects a “generative locus for a number of forms 
of truth” (Foucault, 1994b, p. 4). Legal discourse is not the stuff of divine revelations 
passed down from the creator to the awaiting legal prophet; rather, it emerges as 
historical strokes of chance that then came to constitute what counts as truthful juridical 
forms. The U.S. Constitution is itself the result of historically contingent struggles and 
processes, and specific discursive strategies in which the United States successfully 
rebelled and defeated the British Monarchy. Liberal legality, like discourses and practices 
of exceptionalism, are subject to discursive rules and historically contingent conditions 
(Neal, 2006, p. 36). Due process and claims of constitutional and international law, much 
like the establishment of military commissions and the violation of existing legal 
standards, are “dispersed… and transformed in their contemporary expression and 
exercise” (Neal, 2006, p. 37). Legal discourses are nothing more than normative truth 
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games concerning, “how men govern” according to the production of a specific modality 
of the will to truth (Foucault, 1994j, p. 230). Liberal constitutionalism and exceptional 
measures alike are produced and accepted as domains of “true and correct” within 
ordered and delimited enunciative fields. In summary, post-9/11 discursive deployments 
of exceptionalism constituted terrorism as an existential threat that required the dual 
emergence of a presidential with unlimited authority and an enemy undeserving of 
existing legal protections.  
II. Preemption and Good/Evil: 
Yoo-Flanigan, the Military Order, and the Executive Order fundamentally transformed 
legal/political discourse and deployments of executive state power. Just fourteen days 
after 9/11, John Yoo composed a memo that justified the President as the sole organ of 
government with respect to foreign policy. The three central pillars of the Memo 
(increased presidential authority to initiate wars irrespective of involvement in the 9/11 
attacks, the annihilation of existing legal standards, and the doctrines of pre-emption and 
retaliation) were “built into the text of the President’s [Military] [Order] [and] February 
7 Executive Order that remain virtually unchallenged to the present day (Henn, 2010, p. 
30). Yoo-Flanigan constituted the institutional basis for a series of connected and 
delimited statements in authorizing the President to deploy extraordinary and preemptive 
measures against individuals, groups and states of the Muslim world.  
A. Terrorism and Homicidal Monomania:  
The 9/11 attacks cannot be considered the beginning or reference point for increased 
unilateral presidential power to engage in retaliation and preemptive measures against 
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individuals, groups and states. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, terrorism were constituted as a 
domestic, criminal act and those responsible were brought before American criminal 
courts (Shultz & Vogt, 2003, p. 3). Moreover, the United States refrained from 
establishing terrorism as war despite Bin Laden’s declaration of war against the United 
States in 1998 (Shultz & Vogt, 2003, p. 3). Therefore, the claim that terrorism amounts to 
attacks of war (as per Yoo-Flanigan) can be considered the primary discursive tactic that 
changed the world (rather than the 9/11 attacks) in allowing the President to preemptively 
invade countries at his discretion (Passavant, 2010, p. 562).  
The argument advanced by Yoo (2001, p. 3) that the President has the authority to 
preemptively retaliate against “any person, organization or state suspected” of terrorism 
whether or not they could be linked to the 9/11 attacks is the “Archimedean point by 
which the Bush Administration Office of Legal Counsel sought to undermine” the rights 
of captured prisoners and initiate hostilities abroad (Henn, 2010, p. 32). The twofold 
discursive combination (retaliating against the dangerous and evil terrorist and 
preempting future existential threats) justified regimes of practices to fight “Operation 
Infinite Justice11” (Kellner, 2006, p. 45). Authorities of delimitation (via the executive 
orders) within the post-9/11 legal/political enunciative field manufactured “good/evil,” 
“civilized/uncivilized” and “terrorist/saviour” dichotomies to reconceptualise preemptive 
operations as self-defense within the just war theory (Shultz & Vogt, 2003, p. 26).  
To be clear, the “just war” theory is a classical normative doctrine used to 
differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate wars and was employed by supporters of 
post-9/11 American invasions to fight a just defensive war (Crawford, 2003, p. 5). Bush’s 
                                                           
11 The euphemism used by the Bush Administration in their pursuit of “just” wars. 
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preemptive war doctrine and his claim “to be on a mission from God when he launched 
the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan” (MacAskill, 2005, para. 1), further exemplified 
the good/evil dichotomy that was used in fighting the “never clear and present… 
danger… in an age of terrorism” (Snauwaert, 2004, p. 129). At the same time, this 
justification is discursively and historically contingent and is subject to specific 
problematizations and governmental objects; an alternative conception of this theory of 
what counts as “just” may conceptualize preemptive war as having neither legal nor 
moral authority precisely because the threat is neither present nor clear.  
In deploying American forces in Afghanistan and Iraq to preempt future harm 
(Merskin, 2004, pp. 158-160), the United States engaged in similar tactics and 
rationalities used by the criminal anthropologists in the 1890’s. In a purported rise of 
psychotic killers, criminal anthropologists problematized “an entirely fictitious entity, a 
crime that is insanity, a crime that is nothing but insanity, an insanity that is nothing but a 
crime… this entity was called homicidal monomania” (Foucault, 1994a, p. 182). By way 
of example, the existential threat posed by the evil terrorist is such that not practical to 
apply “the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the 
United States” (Bush, 2001a, p. 2). The problematization of post-9/11 terrorism is similar 
to the rationality employed against homicidal monomania; the Bush Administration 
(much like the Criminal Anthropologists) established entirely new procedures, codes and 
justice systems to preemptive the “axis of evil”. Instead of being privy to existing legal 
standards, captured unlawful combatants required extraordinary measures, including 
indefinite detention without charge, to prevent a future imminent threat.  
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Yoo-Flanigan, the Military Order and the Executive Order problematized new 
government objects that displaced traditional understandings of measures of containment 
and deterrence in favour of preemption to prevent future terror plots (Bush, 2002b, para. 
13). The use of biopolitical techniques were used on groups and individuals not directly 
responsible for the 9/11 attacks. They were used to dehumanize the evil doers which 
therefore justified American military intervention, indefinite detention policies and 
innovative information extraction techniques (i.e. torture) to prevent another 9/11 attack 
(Denbeaux et al, 2015; Rose, 2004, p. 81). These policy directives were deemed to be 
imperative for protecting the forces of good (Merskin, 2004, p. 168) against the evil Arab 
man (much like the monomaniacal homicidal man) that “remains invisible until [he] 
explodes” (Foucault, 1994a, p. 185). These unique problematizations and subsequent 
solutions are deemed crucial in fighting the ever present existential threat of death and 
complete destruction posed by the face of evil.  
B. Discursive Hegemony and Unlawful Combatants: Evil Versus Good: 
Statements concerning unlawful enemy combatants constitute a discursive unity 
alongside “formal identities, thematic continuities, translation of concepts, and polemical 
interchanges” (Foucault, 2002, p. 127). The unlawful combatant designation did not exist 
before post-9/11 discourse but was manufactured by specific problematizations (Kinsella, 
2005, p. 179). A discourse concerning military operations in Afghanistan and a war 
against terrorism was declared, and captured enemies were deemed unlawful because 
they illegally took up arms against the United States (Venzke, 2009, p. 168). This logic is 
circulus in probando; all those who take up arms against the United States are deemed to 
be evil fighters and are indefinitely detained without charge or habeas corpus relief until 
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the end of hostilities because they engaged in hostilities (Bush, 2001a; Hamdi. v. 
Rumsfeld [2004]; Yoo, 2001).  
 The Military Order and the Executive Order are texts pertinent to understanding 
the application and deployment of the classification of “unlawful combatant” as a subject 
unworthy of traditional legal rights. The Military Order determined that the “magnitude 
of the potential deaths, injuries, and property destruction that would result from potential 
acts of terrorisms against the United States” required extraordinary measures to deal with 
the existential threat (Bush, 2001a, p. 2). Extraordinary measures (such as the creation of 
military commissions and the suspension of the GPW) were signed into law to deal with 
the purported threat. In doing so, the “new paradigm [and] thinking in the law of war” 
(Bush, 2002a, p. 1) sought to exclude traditional legal standards for captured detainees. 
The new paradigm constituted domains of exceptionalism (i.e. sovereign power and 
Guantanamo Bay) whereby the executive manufactured expert discursive deployments 
against terrorism to secure the population against the ever-present existential threat.   
 The Military and Executive Orders also transformed normative depictions about 
ways of thinking, feeling and acting towards captured enemies during the War on Terror. 
To demonstrate, the terms “terrorism” or “terrorists” are stated thirteen times in the 
Military Order whereas “prisoners of war” or “due process” are non-existent. Moreover, 
President Bush routinely addressed the War on Terror using rhetoric of this kind:  
Targeting innocent civilians for murder is always and everywhere wrong.                   
(Applause.) Brutality against women is always and everywhere wrong.                       
(Applause.) There can be no neutrality between justice and cruelty, between                           
the innocent and the guilty. We are in a conflict between good and evil, and                     
America will call evil by its name. (Applause.) By confronting evil and                          
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lawless regimes, we do not create a problem, we reveal a problem. And we                     
will lead the world in opposing it. (Bush, 2002b, para. 3). 
In this regard, the United States is fighting a war of righteousness, among good, desirable 
humans and evil, uncivilized and lawless “muselmann12” (Agamben, 1998, p. 186). The 
post-9/11 muselmann is illustrative of a discursive subject-object that “recognize[s] no 
barrier of morality… no conscience… and cannot be reasoned with” (Bush, 2002b). 
According to the State Department, the terrorist is uncivilized and “consumed by a hatred 
of progress, freedom, choice, culture… and laughter… [and] is someone that worships 
only power and then uses that power to kill the innocent without mercy” (Bankoff, 2003, 
p. 425). Moreover, the Bush Administration determined that unlawful combatants do not 
respect the laws of war (Mégret, 2005) and fail to provide humane treatment to American 
prisoners (Delahunty & Yoo, 2005). Terrorists are deemed to be illegitimate, inferior 
belligerents who fail to follow humane standards during warfare (Yoo & Ho, 2003, p. 
11). Therefore, it is only fitting that discourses of exclusion were used to preclude the 
enemy from both traditional military justice and Articles three, four and five of the GPW.  
 Post-9/11 discourse concerning unlawful combatants can be conceptualized as a 
“system of exclusion” (Foucault, 2002, p. 219) whereby particular juridical statements 
(Datta, 2008, p. 126) are accepted as true and correct. Enemy combatants are omitted 
from the U.S. court system (Ratner & Ray, 2004, pp. 1-6) and protections offered to 
prisoners of war in accordance with the GPW (McNamara, 2003). The non-applicability 
of domestic and international laws of war is rooted in the discourses of the uncivilized 
savage other who fails to demonstrate restraint in warfare (Mégret, 2005, p. 282). 
                                                           
12 The Muselmann is the most extreme figure of the Nazi camp. It is a life of “pure zoé”, he is cold, alone 
and awaiting the absolute fury of the SS (Agamben, 1998, p. 186). This figure literally embodies the “living 
dead man” and thus cannot be further dehumanized because there is nothing human left.   
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Discourses of biopolitical dehumanization towards unlawful combatants closely resemble 
that of colonial officials (Bankoff, 2003, p. 425) that classified the indigenous population 
as brutes and savages in Asian, African and North American colonies (Mégret, 2005). 
Civilized Europeans were “restrained, moderate in their violence…from the barbarian 
who [were] like children who allow[ed] their passions to rule their behavior” (Kinsella, 
2005, p. 180). This historical condition resembles the anomie of the enemy combatant 
who is rendered the status of a living dead man (Agamben, 2005; Bush, 2001a). 
American domestic and international law (during the war on terror) differentiates 
between the civilized “us” and the “infrahumanity” (Aradau & Munster, 2009, p. 9) of the 
terrorist that hates everything good and decent in this world (Blair, 2003). Post-9/11 
biopolitical, racialized discourses dehumanize the enemy as being inhumane savages who 
must be indefinitely detained and are not subject to U.S. or international prohibitions 
against torture.  
III. Agamben, Foucault and Sovereignty: 
This subsection deals with what I contend is the re-emergence of sovereign power within 
post- 9/11 discourse and practices. This subsection reconceptualizes Foucauldian and 
Agambenian analysis of sovereign power to analyse the most extreme deployment of 
executive power against unlawful combatants. Foucault often conceptualized sovereign 
power as a “means of deduction” (Foucault, 1978, p. 136) – taking things away – 
exemplified in the “spectacle of the scaffold” (Foucault, 1977, p. 32). Agamben however, 
conceptualized it in terms of his biopolitical sovereign paradigm (1998, p. 181). In this 
respect, Foucauldian and Agambenian conceptions of sovereignty are inadequate on their 
own for providing a sound theoretical account of the newly emergent unilateral 
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presidential authority to wage wars against geopolitical territories and the deployment of 
law as a tactic that transgresses human rights. Refining Foucauldian and Agambenian 
conceptions of power is thus necessary, one that is able to account for both sovereign and 
security that combines both the power to take life or let live of the juridical sovereign and 
the “optimal mean within a tolerable bandwidth of variation… [within] the ensemble of a 
population” of governmental rationality and its valorization of security (Gordon, 1991, p. 
20).  
A. The Return of the Sovereign? 
Following Foucault, Datta (2008, pp. 222-223) argues that the “head of the king has been 
cut off,” given Foucault’s analysis of the rationalities and goals of liberal governmentality 
that have effectively displaced the archaic sovereign concern with territorial rule. Datta’s 
conceptual analysis13 can be used in reconceptualizing the “legally unnamable and 
unclassifiable being” (Agamben, 2005, p. 3) illustrative of unlawful combatants detained 
at Guantanamo Bay and undisclosed black sites. Liberal governmental rationality guides 
the “conduct of conducts” of free subjects (Foucault, 1994d, pp. 341). It is a relationship 
between those who act and those on “whom power is exercised,” operating alongside 
fields of possibilities to minimize or maximize the power relationship (Foucault, 1994d, 
p. 340). Contrary to governmental rationality, unlawful combatants are simply subjugated 
and unable to actively resist; they are deprived of the legal field of contest since they are 
held indefinitely without charge and habeas corpus. Those confined at Guantanamo Bay 
are “low level enemy combatants” (Rumsfeld, 2003b, p. 4) serving as an “interrogation 
battle lab” as stated by Major-General Geoffrey Miller (Rose, 2004, p. 81), for “world-
                                                           
13 I use Datta’s conceptual analysis of the “sovereignty of security” despite his object of concern being the 
emergence of post-politics.  
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wide interrogation, torture training and research” (Denbeaux et al, 2015, p. 3). Unlawful 
combatants exist to test the “effects of torture and the limits of the human spirit” 
(Denbeaux et al, 2015, p. 4). They exist as objects of “pure de facto rule” where “bare life 
reaches its maximum indeterminacy” (Agamben, 2005, p. 4). 
The power to “take life or let live” (Foucault, 1978, p. 136), the power to “foster 
life or disallow it” (Foucault, 1978, p. 138) and the power to guide the “conduct of 
conduct” (Foucault, 1994d, pp. 341-342) are inadequate for analyzing post-9/11 
governance. Therefore a re-conceptualization in terms of a “sovereignty of security” 
(hereafter referred to as the security-sovereign) can be a useful model (Datta, 2008, p. 
229). The sovereign represents the original and founding agent of political order, 
occupying a space both inside and outside the law on which the ancient and modern 
political system exists (Agamben, 1998, p. 9). Yet this founding order has since been 
transferred to “petty sovereigns” (Lippert & Williams, 2012, p. 55) in the securitized state 
to deal with the uncertain risk posed by the terrorist threat.  Yoo-Flanigan (2001, p. 1) 
established the institutional bases for unfettered presidential authority to preempt 
purported future harm against hostile individuals, groups and states regardless of 
involvement in the 9/11 attacks. This new paradigm rationalized Presidential authority to 
preemptively and indefinitely detain non-U.S. citizens (sans habeas corpus relief), in 
violation of existing legality (Everett, 2006; Fitzpatrick, 2002). Moreover, Yoo-Flanigan 
was considered the exclusive legal authority (Passavant, 2010, p. 565) in authorizing 
“unlimited executive power to engage in any tactic, including torture” (Darmer, 2009, p. 
646). Yoo-Flanigan was instrumental in blurring the legal/illegal, inside/outside and 
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rule/exception dichotomies beyond distinction while establishing the continuity of 
security-sovereign monstrosity.  
While the juridical sovereign seeks revenge for a wrong committed against his/her 
realm (See Foucault, 1977, p. 48), security governs through appeals to future catastrophic 
events and extraordinary governmental action to preempt it (Goede, 2011, p. 506). Expert 
post-9/11 documents discursively constituted terrorism as an act of war and 
problematized the unlawful combatant as an always possible existential threat, thereby 
establishing the necessary conditions for the fictional state of emergency14 (See 
Agamben, 1998, pp. 53-56). In this respect, the Bush Administration embodied the 
security-sovereign model: the president institutionalized this new-found power to take 
revenge against the imagined threat to the state’s commitments to socio-economic 
development, i.e., an existential threat, (as noted in the Military Order) and reduced all 
those residing in the Near and Middle East to the inclusive-exclusion of a sovereign ban.  
Unlawful combatants were excluded from the protection of existing constitutional, 
international and military law yet were indefinitely detained by an exercise of sovereign 
power as security threats irrespective of evidence. 
 
Table 1.1: Security, Sovereignty and the Security-Sovereign 
 
 
 
                                                           
14 Agamben (1998, p. 53-56) differentiates between real and fictitious states of exception. A real state of 
exception concerns a state legitimately facing an existential threat whereas a fictitious state of exception 
includes claims of existential threats.  
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Models, Styles of 
Rationality 
Security Sovereignty Security-Sovereign 
Defined as Managing potential 
threats and 
uncertainties. Operates 
through tolerable 
ranges of risk. 
Monarchical right 
over life and death 
with respect to after-
the-fact criminality. 
Exclusive jurisdiction 
over territory 
Power over life, 
death, bodies, 
populations, 
thoughts, and future 
(imagined) deeds. 
Era Primarily associated 
(but not limited to) 
with the rise of liberal 
governmentality. 
Medieval monarchies 
and Absolutism but 
remains in the 
background of liberal 
governmentality 
(e.g., constitutional 
monarchies) 
Specific emergence 
is unknown. It is 
associated with the 
permanent (or real) 
state of exception 
and subsequent state 
deployment  of 
“hyper-
securitization”  
Tactics Functions to preempt, 
contain, displace and 
eliminate intolerable 
risks. 
Means of deduction. 
Primarily governed 
through the threat of 
the public sword. 
Power over life and 
death irrespective of 
previous 
transgression. 
Operates via means 
of preemption, 
elimination and 
displacement on 
thoughts and deeds 
over bodies, 
populations and 
territories. Also 
concerned with battle 
lab experiments.  
Rationalities Liberal 
governmentality of not 
governing “too much” 
or “too little”. Future 
governance of 
potential risks and a 
“better” and 
securitized future. 
Preservation of the 
monarchy and his/her 
principality as 
primary rationality.  
Violent police-
military deployments 
secure populations 
and order. 
Designates and 
classifies new evils 
and authorizes 
extraordinary 
measures, including 
torture and killing. 
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B. The Camp: 
The darkest reaches of the security-sovereign paradigm is realized in the camp as 
opposed to the city:  
The camp is thus the structure in which the state of exception – the possibility                 
of deciding on which founds sovereign power – is realized normally…                       
actually delimits a space in which the normal order is de facto suspended and                          
in which whether or not atrocities are committed depends not on the law but on                     
the civility and ethical sense of the police who temporarily act as sovereign                  
(Agamben, 1998, p. 170, 174).  
Those confined to Guantanamo Bay and American black sites operate outside of 
traditional law and are subject to indefinite (but not unconstrained) political possibilities 
for the exercising of the power of the security-sovereign. While Agamben argued that the 
camp is a geographic spatiality, I propose that it instead functions as a “dividing practice” 
(Foucault, 1994d, p. 326). Those deemed to be security threats are banned from the polity 
and can be subsequently abducted, subject to extraordinary rendition on “secret flights” 
and flown to unknown locations awaiting “waterboarding, forced nudity… and extended 
sleep deprivation while [being] shackl[ed]… in a standing position” (Singh, 2013, p. 16, 
18). In accordance with the Military Order, the President can indefinitely detain an 
individual when “there is reason to believe” that s/he poses a national security threat 
(Bush, 2001a, p. 2). The National Defense Authorization Act (2012, hereafter, “NDAA”) 
illustrated an even darker realization. Section 1021 of the NDAA originally authorized 
“indefinite detention of American citizens without due process at the discretion of the 
President” (2012).15 To go one step further, a leaked 2013 NBC news article (referred to 
as the White Paper) claimed a high ranking U.S. government official could assassinate a 
U.S. or non-U.S. citizen who poses an “immanent [security] threat” without the need to 
                                                           
15 This section of the NDAA was later amended to only include non-U.S. citizens 
 98 
 
show that a such an act can be reasonably expected to occur in the “immediate future” 
(pp. 6-7). In this regard, all non-U.S. citizens already exist as security threats within the 
President’s zone of indistinction: security threats can be indefinitely detained and/or 
subject to assassination.  
 While Datta (2008, p. 229) argues that the sovereignty of security concerns the 
“thoughts” (i.e., discursive practices) rather than the body as governmental objects, I 
argue that the sovereign/security paradigm at Guantanamo includes and excludes styles of 
government. Security exercises its power over “the thought of a different future,” (Datta, 
2008, p. 229), populations and tolerable ranges of action (Hunt & Wickham, 1994, p. 54) 
whereas sovereignty operates on bodies, death and time within a territory (Foucault, 
1978, p. 136; 2007, p. 25). However, President Bush’s executive orders constituted power 
over an “indefinite series of events” (Foucault, 2007, p. 35), life, territories, and thoughts. 
The executive orders designated President Bush as the exclusive creator, enforcer and 
arbiter of law (Johns, 2005, p. 619). While the classical sovereign is solely concerned 
with after-the-fact criminality over their principality, the executive orders established 
purported threats, deeds, and thoughts over the Near and Middle East as terrorism subject 
to presidential designation  (Bush, 2001a, p. 2) to be indefinitely detained without habeas 
corpus. In doing so, conventional understandings of sovereignty and security and the 
sovereign-security paradigm are further impeded.  
While Donald Rumsfeld claimed that Guantanamo is used to house “the worst of 
the worst” (Denbeaux & Denbeaux, 2006, p. 4) to prevent future terrorist attacks, the 
“true purpose behind the base… [was] [a] world-wide interrogation and torture training 
and research” program (Denbeaux et al, 2015, p. 26; See also Mestrovic & Lorenzo, 
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2008, p. 184). Torture and research programs at Guantanamo were not authorized by a 
few bad apples in lower military ranks but were deployed by President Bush. To illustrate 
this reality, Intelligence Commander of the battle lab experimentation mission (Major 
General Michael Dunlavey), declared under oath that “I got my marching orders from the 
President of the United States” (Denbeaux et al, 2015, p. 5). With unfettered power from 
court immunity authorized by President Bush, U.S. authorities engaged in severe torture 
methods including the breaking of bones, genital mutilation (Singh, 2013, p. 97), and 
medically induced psychosis before the brink of organ failure on detainees (including 
Chinese Muslims) who posed no serious threat to American interests (Denbeaux & 
Denbeaux, 2006, p. 3; Denbeaux et al, 2015, p. 31). The primary purpose of Guantanamo 
Bay is unrelated to past or future detainee wrongdoing but instead operates to “radically 
create” new torture techniques for future battlefield operations (Denbeaux et al, 2005, p. 
13; See also Mestrovic & Lorenzo, 2008). Detainees are monitored by medical experts 
during interrogations to prevent organ failure and death to ensure the survival of the 
purchased lab rat (Denbeaux et al, 2015, p. ii).  
Battle lab operations at Guantanamo Bay employ the darkest features of the 
security-sovereign. Security functions to preempt, contain and eliminate intolerable risks 
(Deukmedjian, 2013, p. 55; See also Table 1) while the sovereign tortures and kills the 
regicide (Foucault, 1977, p. 12). The majority of detainees are deemed to be low level 
risks and determined as having never committed “any hostile acts” against the United 
States or its allies (Denbeaux & Denbeaux, 2006, p. 2; See also Welch, 2009, p. 69). 
Detainees are “transported in chains… and come to inhabit a racialized space left vacant 
by their historical brethren who are always actively reproduced as bare life: rebels, 
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refugees and slaves” (Reid-Henry, 2007, p. 641). The majority of detainees (80 percent) 
were purchased by U.S. authorities16 (for the sum of $ 3000 to $ 25 000) from Pakistani 
and Afghani tribal enemies (Honigsberg, 2010, p. 82) while being shackled to the ceiling 
by chains17 (Gillian, 2005). In an effort to protest their indefinite detention, inhumane 
treatment and bodily integrity, detainees engage in hunger strikes (Hutchinson et al, 2013, 
p. 227). This act of detainee resistance is matched by American force-feeding practices 
(Hutchinson et al, 2013, p. 227). In doing so, detainees exist as slaves to serve their 
masters; they are bought and sold regardless of past criminality, are subject to indefinite 
detention and infinite physical and psychological torture to the point of organ failure and 
death and are force-fed to ensure their continued destiny as the purchased lab rat.  
Plenary Commander-in-Chief authority (first proposed in Yoo-Flanigan) justified 
both enhanced interrogation methods (including battle lab experimentation) and military 
commissions (Denbeux et al, 2015, p. 25; Feinstein, 2014, p. 181). Yoo-Flanigan 
discursively deployed the re-emergence of the sovereign that was concerned with bodies, 
truth extraction, and territory but added to this list populations, and future threats to life 
(See Table 1). In protecting U.S. national security, the security-sovereign constructed 
Guantanamo Bay as a laboratory for purchased human test subjects. To be clear, the 
security-sovereign and the human slave (i.e. unlawful combatants) were “objectiviz[ed]” 
as specific subjects (Foucault, 1994d, p. 326) by post-9/11 governmental discursive 
                                                           
16 The practice of being bought and sold bears resemblance to the practice of human trafficking. The United 
Nations Trafficking Protocol defines human trafficking as “the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall 
include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual 
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal, 
manipulation or implantation of organs” 
 
17 Chains and collars used at Guantanamo in 2005 were manufactured by Hiatt & Company that also 
produced “nigger chains” during the 18th century.  
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practices for identifying “terrorism,” plenary presidential power and unlawful 
combatants.  
Objectivization and subjectivization are not independent process but instead are 
co-constituted in domains of truth telling (Veyne, 2010, p. 87).  The “objectivizing” of 
the President as the “speaking subject” (Foucault, 1994d, p. 326; See also Veyne, 2010, 
pp. 87-88) authorized extraordinary deployments of executive power (i.e. the Military 
Order) against the newly constituted unlawful combatant subject/object. The newly 
subjectivized all-seeing sovereign-subject constituted populations and bodies, torture, but 
not death, and efficient scientific torture truth extraction methods as proper tactics and 
solutions to the terrorist problem (See Table 1). The problematization of the existential 
threat (posed by terrorism) required “hyper securitization” and preemptive measures to 
ensure the safety and security of the United States (Dean, 2007, pp. 192-193). The 
objectification of sovereign executive power and subsequent deployment of military 
commissions and lab experimentation illustrates the radical realizations of the post-9/11 
sovereign-subject monstrosity. Terrorists were constituted as the savage-subject which 
required lab experimentation on low risk detainees “to generate data with which to 
counsel and train interrogators at military facilities across the globe” (Denbeaux et al, 
2015, p. ii). The camp is necessary to ensure continued survival of the rationality of 
hyper-securitization of the United States.  
While Datta provides a compelling theoretical tool for explaining tactics and 
rationalities of the security-king, a further development is necessary in accordance with 
the post-9/11 battle lab. The security-sovereign monopolizes the power over life and 
death with respect to past and future thoughts, deeds and threats. However, the majority 
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of detainees at Guantanamo pose no serious threat but are instead indefinitely detained to 
serve the production of scientific knowledge concerning interrogation techniques for 
future battlefield deployments. While the monarchical sovereign is limited to rationalities 
and tactics of life, death and the end of sovereignty, the security-sovereign’s power is 
limitless precisely because “apparatuses of security” produces security-sovereign 
rationality and tactics that “draw and sustain that limit” (Datta, 2008, p.231; See also 
Table 1). The problematization of plenary presidential authority post-9/11 constitutes the 
unlawful combatant as an existential threat that requires limitless national security 
measures. The production of truth (via pertinent documents) poses the problem of the evil 
doer as well as the necessity of unlimited presidential authority to displace, contain and 
eliminate the threat. Thus, the camp embodies the most extreme boundaries of necessity, 
the security-sovereign and terrorism. The security-sovereign knows no boundaries nor 
limits due to the fact that the security-sovereign produces pertinent documents and 
classifications of legal/illegal, good/bad and existential/low threats. Guantanamo Bay 
belongs neither to the state of nature nor the polity. Detainees are rendered to the barest 
designation of the homo sacer/wolf man. Detainees have neither transgressed the law nor 
pose a future threat; instead they exist as dehumanized and valueless (apart from for 
experimentation purposes) lab test-subjects for the imagined future evil doer. In 
summary, Guantanamo guinea pigs exist within the boundaries of the security-sovereign 
rationality because expert discourse designates and determines appropriate discursive 
objects and unfettered discursive deployment.  
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IV: Conclusion 
 This chapter analyzed and reconceptualized the pertinent elements of Datta’s 
model of security. Legal discourse was shown to be a continuously shifting set of 
statements, polemics, problematizations and manifestations of a will to truth. I 
conceptualize Yoo-Flanigan as the post-9/11 institutional basis for unilateral presidential 
authority to initiate “extraordinary” measures in subsequent executive orders and 
deployments of power. That is to say, post-9/11 American foreign policy reflects a radical 
departure from the “normal processes of law” (Dean, 2007, p. 190) and existing 
rationalities of the legal complex. The President problematized terrorism as an existential 
threat, unilaterally established a separate military justice system and suspended the GPW. 
The problematization of a new paradigmatic threat authorized the re-emergence of the 
founding constitutional order that both functions inside and outside of the law (see Datta, 
2008, p. 229). Medieval sovereignty merged with apparatuses of security in an all-out 
effort to securitize the homeland against the ever-present terrorist threat. Agamben’s 
conception of the camp embodies the maximum indeterminacy of the security-sovereign: 
those confined to the camp are subject to indefinite detention and infinite physical and 
psychological trauma irrespective of past criminality or future risk. Lab experimentation 
is conducted on low level detainees to develop the most advanced and effective 
interrogation methods to test on purported future terrorist threats.  
 Unique post-9/11 problematizations constituted the emergence of new 
rationalities and solutions in opposition to existing legal discourse and practices. 
Reconceptualizing of Foucault and Agamben facilitated a more comprehensive analysis 
of the radical exclusion of unlawful combatants from existing discourse and regimes of 
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practice. Post-9/11 U.S. state power cannot be properly conceptualized as biopolitical 
sovereignty or the power over life and death.  Instead, post-9/11 governance can be 
conceptualized in accordance with the security-sovereign that problematized the terrorist 
as an existential threat which required a new military justice system, legal discourses and 
delegated authority to high ranking government officials (i.e. petty sovereigns). The 
continuous threat posed by the inferior, evil savage justifies exceptional measures, radical 
exclusion of human rights for those not yet charged of wrongdoing and hyper-militarized 
operations against the Near and Middle East. In an effort to combat terrorism, the Bush 
Administration deployed sophisticated torture regimes and lab experimentations on low 
level security risks. In constituting the enemy as evil doers and terrorists, the Bush 
Administration engaged in indefinite detention and infinite torture methods that can be 
considered nothing less than institutionalized state crime. This is the focus of my next 
chapter.  
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9. DISCUSSION 
I. State Crime and Impunity 
The tripartite post-9/11 problematizations of plenary presidential authority, terrorism and 
unlawful combatants reflect a state of impunity; high ranking government officials 
responsible for state or war crimes are protected by newly configured post-9/11 
legal/political discourses that suspended existing legal standards. Post-9/11 pertinent 
documents created new “legal” moves for monopolizing governmental authority in the re-
emergence of sovereign power- conceptualized as the security-sovereign -. Newly 
constituted political/legal discourse produced law that shed every relation to existing 
legal standards, executive courts (i.e. military commissions) that have no basis in 
traditional judicial courts and a legal process that bears no resemblance to due process 
(See Butler, 2004, p. 62). Yoo-Flanigan, the Military Order and Executive Order 
established three discursive objectives: 1) the unfettered presidential authority to initiate 
hostilities and retaliate against those he deems to be enemy states, groups and individuals; 
2) the suspension of existing criminal, military and international law concerning captured 
prisoners which places detainees beyond the geographic-spatiality of law; 3) to radically 
re-define limits of state power including prohibitions against torture and absolve 
responsibility for those responsible for drafting and implementing enhanced interrogation 
methods (See Dratel, 2005, p. xxi; See also Welch, 2009, p. 23). As a result, government 
officials (or their designated agents such as private contractors) at Guantanamo Bay and 
CIA black sites are (essentially) given torture licenses to tests the limits of physical and 
psychological torture on purchased human lab rats.  
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 Post-9/11 discursive deployment of physical and psychological torture is not the 
result of a totalizing, single security-sovereign but the cooperation and recruitment of 
petty security-sovereigns (e.g. John Yoo, Dick Cheney, Michael Hayden or Michael 
Dunlavey – whoever happens to occupy the position -) that transfer power from one local 
and site to another (Garland, 1997, p. 182). To be clear, Michael Dunlavey or Dick 
Cheney are of little significance; this thesis is concerned with the actualizing apparatuses 
of the security-sovereign. The production of neutralization techniques by government 
officials against detainees is enunciated via expert political/legal discourse that informs, 
guides and transmits the torture culture. Torture practices cannot be explained by 
recourse to a few “bad apples” but are widely dispersed in post-9/11 torture-cultures. 
Post-9/11 discourse shrouded the War on Terror as a “crusade” against evil, barbaric and 
uncivilized savages (Kellner, 2006, p. 45). The U.S. executive employed psychologists 
(Feinstein, 2014, p. 46), psychiatrists, doctors and other medical personnel to test the 
most sophisticated scientific experiments on the limits of torture efficacy and the human 
psyche (Denbeaux, et al, 2015). Detainees at Guantanamo are regularly given “mind-
altering drugs” including mefloquine (used to treat malaria) at five times the 
recommended legal dose for the purposes of producing extreme side-effects including 
anxiety, paranoia and alternate states of mind including pushing the detainee to the brink 
of suicide and depression (Denbeaux et al, 2015, p. 27). Other experimental torture 
techniques include being chained and shackled up in the fetal position for up to twenty-
four hours (Lewis, 2005), female sexual assault on detainees (Lewis & Schmitt, 2005, p. 
35), exposure to extreme conditions of hot and cold, death threats, rectal force-feeding 
(Feinstein, 2014), and severe beatings (Welch, 2005, p. 91). The aim of the physical and 
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psychological torture program is clear: the security-sovereign conducts scientific 
experimentation and “behavioural modification” to breakdown detainee resistance which 
can be used on future high profile detainees during battlefield operations and/or 
interrogations (Denbeaux et al, 2015, p. 27); such is the actuality of the security-
sovereign’s will to truth. 
 As discussed in the results section, post-9/11 discourse and regimes of practice are 
not inevitable and inherently necessary as demonstrated by Congressmen Ron Paul’s 
proposal to issue private warrants to American citizens against those directly responsible 
for the 9/11 attacks. Instead, post-9/11 governance can be conceptualized in terms of a 
state crime perspective. At the core of any state are powerful individuals, departments, 
organizations and elected representatives. The Military Order and the Torture Papers 
(constituted by President Bush and other high ranking government officials) suspended 
existing military legal standards and constituted a separate military justice that authorized 
enhanced interrogation methods previously deemed illegal by the traditional military 
justice system and the GPW. While the War on Terror is responsible for the overthrow of 
regimes and resulting chaos including the deaths of over 405 000 Iraqis (Hagopian et al, 
2013, p. 1), new detention facilities outside of existing due process that Amnesty 
International estimates holds over 70 000 detainees (Dean, 2007, p. 168) it also 
authorized the corporate/government collusion of war profiteering (Welch, 2009, pp. 105-
106). By way of example, the U.S. executive awarded Halliburton (a U.S. defense 
contractor) government contracts worth upwards of 155 million dollars to re-construct 
Guantanamo Bay as a military prison after the 9/11 attacks (McCulloch, 2007, p. 28; 
Pease, 2003, p. 15). This instance of government/corporate collusion is extremely 
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problematic given the fact that then-Vice President Dick Cheney held more than 433 000 
stock options in the corporation (worth 36 million dollars) when the contract was 
awarded (Welch, 2009, p. 106). Moreover, other instances of war profiteering and 
collusion include the fact that Halliburton was the largest corporate war profiteer in the 
Iraq War, earning more than 3.9 billion US dollars from military contracts in 2003 alone 
(Chatterjee, 2004, p. 39). Halliburton is just the tip of the iceberg of high ranking 
corporate/government policy planners that profiteered in committing war crimes against 
Afghanistan and Iraq (See Kramer & Michaelowski, 2005, p. 460). In summary, a post-
9/11 discourse of indefinite and unconstrained political possibilities manufactured a 
political realm of extraordinary state crime illustrative of preemptive war, torture cultures 
and high ranking government/corporate collusion of war profiteering.  
Post-9/11 problematizations of terrorism, pre-emption and retaliation, unlawful 
combatants and plenary constitutional authority produce and justify institutionalized 
regimes of dehumanization and torture. The post-9/11 American torture-culture (See 
Kinsella, 2005; See also Mégret, 2005) denied responsibility (Bin Laden and Saddam 
started the war) denied victims of torture (those captured are evil savages unworthy of 
protection) and appealed to higher authorities including President Bush’s claim that he 
was instructed by God to liberate Iraq (Welch, 2009, p. 168). This blanket denial of 
responsibility is linked to my research questions; post-9/11 pertinent documents deployed 
a series of marginalized, constrained and delimited statements and practices concerning 
the War on Terror and the emergence of the security-sovereign and the purchased 
unlawful combatant. Executive deployments of preemption, retaliation and torture against 
suspected states, groups and individuals is the result of post-9/11 discourses that 
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suspended existing law and established separate justice systems that authorized extreme 
exercises of power against captured Muslims. Pertinent post-9/11 documents (i.e. the 
Military and Executive Orders) manufactured legal black holes whereby abuses of power, 
including war profiteering by the corporate/government collusion and the deployment of 
battle laboratories authorized by the President, were approved by the highest reaches of 
the U.S. government.  
In short, in response to the 9/11 attacks, the Bush Administration deployed a 
series of connected and delimited statements in authorizing the following widespread 
deployments of state crime: 1)  the authorization of military commissions violated 
constitutional, military and international law in developing a torture regime illustrative of 
rectal force-feeding and battle lab experimentation; 2) the invasion of Iraq resulting in 
over 405 000 deaths and construction of detention facilities including secret black sites 
and Abu Ghraib; 3) the formation of discursive neutralization and a state of impunity for 
the gross violation of human rights law. The suspension of existing legal standards, the 
violation of constitutional, international and military law and the widespread regimes of 
torture are worthy of criminological consideration.  
II. Considerations for Future Research: 
 While I have focused here on post-9/11 legal/political discourses that suspended 
existing legal standards and established alternate legal/illegal, truth/false and good/bad 
games of truth, an archaeological excavation into the problematization of 
constitutionalism is an area of similar and future research. The American Founding 
Fathers posed the problem of executive tyranny which constituted a constitutional 
separation of powers between judicial, legislative and judicial branches (See Malcolmson 
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& Myers, 2009, p. 38). Scholars critical of state abuses of power post-9/11 consider the 
violation of the separation of powers doctrine by the Bush Administration to be partly 
responsible (See Fisher, 2011; See also Henn, 2010). An archaeological excavation of 
constitutional texts, interpretive practices, judicial precedent, and customary law is 
worthy of criminological/legal analysis. Did post-9/11 legal/political discourse violate 
American constitutional law? If so, a state crime perspective, based on the rule of law, 
may be used to punish high ranking state officials that not only violated key 
constitutional principles but also initiated cultures and regimes of torture? What might the 
discursive effects of constitutionalism be able to tell us about the tensions between 
sovereignty and liberalism as models of rule? While this may be considered a normative 
endeavour and thus contrary to Foucauldian studies, legal system and illegal/legal 
designations are also polemical frameworks.   
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10. CONCLUSION 
 Drawing on Foucault and Agamben, I critically investigated post-9/11 sovereign 
logics and discursive frameworks. I demonstrated how key texts posed specific problems 
of how to govern that transformed existing liberal discourses and governmental logics. 
Answers to the two research questions revealed the emergence of binary post-9/11 
objectivization/subjectivization games of truth. Overall, this thesis reflects the twofold 
emergence of the security-sovereign and the unlawful combatant as governmental 
subjects/objects.  
 This research critically analyzed Foucaudian and Agambenian scholarship in 
accordance with the rise of unlawful combatants and sovereign power. I demonstrated 
how Agambenian literature is largely concerned with the biopolitical paradigm and its 
inherent linkage to the sovereign ban. Put simply, from Ancient Rome to modern 
governance, the sovereign power constitutes bare life. For Foucault, however, power is 
much more complex and nuanced. Power is constituted by diverse governmental 
rationalities, knowledges, logics and apparatuses. Sovereign power is but one resource in 
modern governmentality. Modern rule emerges from heterogeneous discourses, tactics 
and deployments of power that is primarily concerned with liberal rationality and rule. At 
the same time, sovereign power has not disappeared but remains firmly in the background 
of liberal governmentality.  
 The data set, consisted of the key texts of Yoo-Flanigan, the Military Order and 
the Executive Order and demonstrated the emergence of new kinds of governance. First, 
the results section reflected the rise of discourses and practices of retaliation, plenary 
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presidential authority and pre-emption. Second, the Military Order established new legal 
discourses/complexes in transgressing existing military and international law and also 
violated judicial and congressional vested powers. Last, the Executive Order reflects the 
emergence of the “new paradigm” that suspended international human rights previously 
guaranteed by the GPW.  
The analysis section reflects three key component parts outlined in the results. 
First, it analyzes law as a will to truth, between existing legal standards and new 
transformative games of truth. In this sense, law is not solely reflected in the strict, 
established legal tradition but also newly constituted normative truth games. Second, I 
analyzed how this legal discourse constituted a new class of subject, the dehumanization 
of the evil, uncivilized, and savage “unlawful combatant.” In constituting the enemy as an 
infrahuman (Aradau & Munster, 2009, p. 9) consumed by hatred and waiting to kill 
innocent victims, the U.S. executive were justified in deploying regimes of torture. Last, I 
analyzed the re-emergence of sovereign power in the form of the security-sovereign. 
Logics of sovereignty (power over life and death) and security (pre-empting future harm) 
alone are incompatible in explicating widespread tactics of hyper-securitization (Dean, 
2007, p. 192). Rather than limit itself to past criminal transgression or purported future 
harm, the security-sovereign purchased human test-subjects. The rationality of such 
practices cannot be properly conceptualized as a security or a sovereign style of 
government but  can instead be aptly reconceptualised as the effect of a new kind of 
governance: the security-sovereign.  
 Post-9/11 discursive deployments are illustrative of U.S. executives that criminal, 
military and international law. In transgressing all established legal standards, the U.S. 
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executive were granted exclusive jurisdiction to act outsides the confines of the law in 
invading countries irrespective of past wrongdoing and institutionalizing torture programs 
against purchased test subjects. Experimental, psychological regimes whereby U.S. 
medical personnel administer large and illegal doses of drugs for the purposes of breaking 
the detainee psyche illustrates the most abhorrent realizations of the security-king 
abomination.. Was the invasion of Iraq (which killed hundreds of thousands of Iraqis) 
conducted for the purposes of human trafficking and experimental testing?  In closing, 
what I have aimed to offer is a critical, but careful reconceptualization of post-9/11 
rationalities of governance. The problematization of sovereign power, unrestrained war 
powers and the constitution of unlawful combatants outside of existing legality belie the 
purported dominance of liberal governance. Post-9/11 American governance is 
illustrative of an obliteration of the rule of law and the federal government operates as an 
“oligarchy” (Gilens & Page, 2014, p. 566). The issue of whether the Iraq war was 
initiated to free the Iraqis or for corporate profit is a highly contentious issue. Moreover, 
unlimited hyper-securitization, exceptionalism, institutionalized torture and arbitrary 
assassination against both U.S. and non-U.S. citizens (i.e. the drone program) cannot be 
properly analyzed through a liberal lens. If liberal governance is conceptualized as not 
governing “too much” and following established legal norms, how can exceptional 
governance be conceptualized within the liberal rationality? The security-sovereign’s lab 
rats at Guantanamo Bay place the limits of liberal rationality into sharp relief; they have 
been displaced by discourses and rationalities of risk, hyper-securitization (including 
bailouts and quantitative easing) and systems of mass exclusion. Instead, I consider it apt 
to conceptualize the suspension of existing legality, aggressive foreign invasions and 
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institutionalized regimes of torture within the dominance of exceptional governance 
whereby liberalism functions at the margins of arbitrary and lawless governance.   
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